Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland by Grossman, Steven P. & Shapiro, Stephen J.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 Fall 2003 Article 2
2003
Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland
Steven P. Grossman
University of Baltimore School of Law, sgrossman@ubalt.edu
Stephen J. Shapiro
University of Baltimore School of Law, sshapiro@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Grossman, Steven P. and Shapiro, Stephen J. (2003) "Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland," University of Baltimore Law
Review: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol33/iss1/2
JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF SENTENCES 
IN MARYLAND 
Professor Steven Grossmant 
Professor Stephen Shapirott 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Maryland, judges who hand out criminal sentences have very 
broad power to subsequently reduce those sentences. 1 The sentenc-
ingjudge may reduce a sentence at any time for any reason, as long as 
the defendant has filed a motion to modify the sentence within ninety 
days.2 Not only does the judge retain this power throughout the en-
tirety of the defendant's sentence, it also allows him to modify a sen-
tence to Probation Before Judgment ("PBj") after the original 
sentence was served. 
Although judges in most states have some power to revise sentences, 
in almost all others there is a time limit ranging from one week to one 
year, unless the modification is to correct a mistake or an illegal sen-
tence.3 In the very few other states that give judges a longer period to 
modify a sentence, there are normally severe restrictions imposed.4 
In the last few years, the broad power of Maryland judges to modify 
sentences has come under attack from many sources, including prose-
t Professor Steven Grossman is the Dean Julius Isaacson Professor of Law at 
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1. Sentence reduction is controlled by Rule 4-345 of the Maryland Rules. MD. 
R. 4-345(b) (2003). See infra note 16 and accompanying text for the text of 
this rule. 
2. See State v. Robinson, 106 Md. App. 720, 723, 666A.2d 909, 911(1995). See 
infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. See 
also MD. R. 4-345(b). 
3. See infra Part III (reviewing the law in other states). 
4. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. 
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cutors, victims' rights advocates, members of the state legislature, and 
the media.5 Those opposing the practice have cited a few specific 
cases where the power has been abused, such as when violent 
criminals serving long sentences were released early without notifica-
tion to victims.6 Recent amendments to the law have added signifi-
cant procedural safeguards to the process, such as a requirement of a 
hearing, notice to victims, and a requirement of a decision, with ex-
planation, on the record.7 
Yet opponents of the practice would still like to see it abolished or 
significantly curtailed. One bill, introduced during the 2002 legisla-
tive session, would have imposed a one-year time limit on any sen-
tence modifications.8 The bill was quite controversial and received 
support from the then Lieutenant Governor, as well as victims' rights 
groups and prosecutors.9 The bill was opposed by both the criminal 
defense bar and by virtually all trial judges. lo 
During legislative hearings, it became clear that no one had an ac-
curate picture of just how often and in what kinds of cases sentence 
modification was used. This was because virtually no jurisdictions or 
individual judges kept accurate and complete records of the granting 
and denial of such requests. 
The authors of this Article were members of a task force formed by 
the Maryland State Bar Association ("MSBA") to conduct a study of 
the practice in Maryland. II The most important piece of this study 
5. On February 4 and 5, 2001, the Washington Post ran two front-page articles 
criticizing the broad discretion given to judges in Maryland to reduce 
sentences, the use of that power by Maryland judges, and the failure of the 
legislature to act to amend the law. Lori Montgomery & Daniel LeDuc, 
Crime, Punishment-Shaped by One Man; Loopholes Undo Mandatory Sentences, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Loopholes]; Lori Montgomery 
& Daniel LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality; judges Can Cut Terms for Whatever 
Reason-or No Reason, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Sentences 
Without Finality]. 
6. See, e.g., Montgomery & LeDuc, Loopholes, supra note 5 (describing a Mary-
land judge's use of sentencing modification power to cut the sentence of a 
man convicted of drug dealing and illegal possession of a handgun from 
twelve to five years); Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra 
note 5 (describing another instance in which a judge reduced a five-year 
prison sentence to probation, thereby releasing a man who had killed an-
other man in an altercation over money). 
7. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (describing the amendments). 
8. S. 73, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002); H.D. 160, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2002). 
9. On January 13, 2002, the Washington Post reported that "Townsend (D) 
has pledged that one of her top priorities this year is legislation to limit 
judges' ability to reduce criminals' time in prison .... " Daniel LeDuc, 
Townsend Seeks to Curb judge's Rnle in Md. Legislature, Victim Advocates Target 
Power to Cut Sentences Years Later, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2002, at C4. 
10. Id. 
11. Professor Grossman was chair of the Committee. In addition to Professor 
Shapiro, other members of the Committee included Professor Jose Ander-
son of the University of Baltimore and Buzz Winchester of the MSBA. 
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was a survey of all district and circuit court judges in Maryland. The 
Survey questioned the judges about their use of sentence modifica-
tion, including how often they used the procedure, how long after 
sentencing, the types of cases in which modification was used, and the 
reasons for its uses. 12 The results of the Survey were reported to the 
criminal justice council of the MSBA and to the Maryland General 
Assembly. 13 
This Article grew out of that Survey and represents the views of the 
authors only and not the MSBA. Part II of this Article will first explain 
the law relating to, and history of, the judges' revisory power in Mary-
land. Part III will examine the law in other states and in federal 
courts. The Article will then look at how the purposes of sentence 
modification fit with various theories of punishment. Part V will re-
view arguments for and against the procedure and explore alterna-
tives for accomplishing the same goals. Part VI will report and 
interpret the results of the Survey of Maryland judges. Finally, the 
authors will give their conclusions as to the use of sentence modifica-
tion in Maryland and their recommendations for any changes in the 
law. 
The authors conclude that the overwhelming majority of cases in 
which the practice is used are for non-violent drug and theft offenses, 
where the possibility of sentence modification is a powerful incentive 
toward the completion of drug and alcohol treatment programs or 
toward restitution to the victim. Even many critics of the practice do 
not oppose its use in these cases. Although modification for these 
purposes normally takes place within one year of sentencing, there are 
many instances where judges need two or even three years to confirm 
that the defendant has completed his or her rehabilitation. A one-
year time limit would significantly interfere with this process. 
Sentence modification for persons serving more serious, often vio-
lent crimes, is much more controversial; although the number is 
much smaller, some cases do exist. In a few cases, the system has been 
abused or judges have failed to follow proper procedural guidelines. 
The authors believe, however, that, although sentence reduction 
should be used carefully and sparingly in cases where long prison 
sentences have been handed down, it is a useful tool in some cases 
and should not be restricted to only certain crimes or to a certain time 
period. 
It is important that the procedural safeguards be strictly followed 
and that some form of centralized record-keeping be maintained. 
These protections would eliminate most improper uses of sentence 
12. See infra Part VI; Appendix. 
13. Professors Grossman and Anderson, along with Mr. Winchester, testified 
before the House Judiciary Committee on March 11, 2003. The results of 
the judges' survey were presented to the Senate Committee on Judicial Pro-
ceedings on February 27, 2003. 
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modification. They will also allow sentence modification to continue 
in the many cases where it is helpful to the rehabilitation of non-vio-
lent offenders, and in the few cases where it is warranted, even when 
the defendant has committed a serious crime of violence. 
II. THE MARYLAND LAW OF SENTENCE MODIFICATION 
Ajudge's power to modify a sentence in a criminal case is not new 
to Maryland law. As early as 1890, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recognized "the long-established principle that courts have power to 
set aside or change their judgments during the term at which they are 
entered."14 Since 1951, this power has been specified by court rules. 15 
The current governing rule reads, in pertinent part: 
Rule 4-345. Sentencing - Revisory power of court. 
(b) Modification or reduction - Time for. The court has re-
visory power and control over a sentence upon a motion 
filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District 
Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a cir-
cuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. Thereaf-
ter, the court has revisory power and control over the 
sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as pro-
vided in section (e) of this Rule. The court may not increase 
a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that 
it may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a 
sentence if the correction is made on the record before the 
defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing 
proceeding. 16 
The rule is clear that a judge has the power to modify a legally im-
posed sentence-not tainted by fraud, mistake or irregularity-only if 
the defendant files a motion within ninety days of its imposition. 17 
This requirement was held to be jurisdictional and has been strictly 
enforced. What is not so clear from the language of the rule is how 
long this power continues after a defendant has filed a timely motion. 
Must the judge rule on the motion within some time limit, or may he 
hold it sub cuna for the length of the sentence? 
Under the current rule, the question of whether there was any time 
limitation on a judge's power to reduce a properly imposed criminal 
sentence l8 was specifically addressed by the Court of Special Appeals 
14. State v. Butler, 72 Md. 98, 100, 18 A. 1105, 1106 (1890). 
15. See Robinson v. State, 106 Md. App. 720, 722-23, 666 A.2d 909, 911 (1995). 
16. MD. R. 4-345(b) (2003). 
17. Id. 
18. This article addresses only the question of a judge's power to reduce, not 
increase a sentence. Ajudge's power to increase a sentence is limited to 
correcting "an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the 
correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the court-
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of Maryland in State v. Robinson. 19 In Robinson, the defendant was 
given a ten-year sentence in 1990 for various crimes, including assault 
with intent to maim.20 Defendant filed a timely motion for sentence 
modification within ninety days of the imposition of the sentence.2 ! 
In 1994, four and one-half years after it had been imposed, the trial 
judge, following a hearing on the motion, modified the sentence by 
suspending the unserved portion of it and imposing a term of five-
years probation.22 The state appealed, claiming that the trial judge 
lacked the authority to modify a sentence four and one-half years after 
it was imposed.23 The court of special appeals, after a thorough re-
view of the history of sentence modification in Maryland, held that a 
judge does have the power to modify the sentence at any time, as long 
as the motion to modify was filed within ninety days of the imposition 
of the sentence.24 
The court began its analysis by noting that under the common law, 
a court in Maryland had revisory power over its judgments, including 
the power to modify sentences, "only during the term of court in 
which the judgment was issued."25 That limitation was changed in 
1951 by Rule lO(c) of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure.26 
This rule provided the court the power to reduce a sentence within 
ninety days of its imposition.27 The court had this power whether the 
defendant had moved for such modification or not, and retained this 
power for ninety days even if the term of one court might have ex-
pired and another begun.28 The purpose of the new rule was to "ame-
liorate the harshness of the former practice."29 
room following the sentencing proceeding." Id. This restnctJon is re-
quired by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This article also does not address the question 
of ajudge's power to correct an "illegal" sentence, which may be done "at 
any time." MD. R. 4-345(a). 
19. 106 Md. App. 720, 666 A.2d 909. 
20. Id. at 721, 666 A.2d at 910. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 721-22, 666 A.2d at 910. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 724, 666 A.2d at 912. 
25. Id. at 722, 666 A.2d at 910; see also Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 159-60, 433 
A.2d 1150, 1153 (1981); State v. Butler, 72 Md. 98, 100-01, 18 A. 1105, 1106 
(1890) (discussing the Maryland common law rule dealing with modifica-
tion of judgments). 
26. See generally Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 434, 109 A.2d 96, 100 (1954) 
(discussing the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part 4, Rule 
10(c». 
27. Id. The rule applied in all criminal cases except those involving bastardy, 
desertion, and non-support. Id. 
28. Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 722-23, 666 A.2d at 911. 
29. Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29,40,333 A.2d 37, 43 (1975). Under the former 
practice, the jurisdiction of the court to modify a sentence expired after the 
term in which the judgment had been entered. [d. 
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According to the Robinson court, "the time period within which a 
judge could modify [a] sentence was significantly expanded" in 1961 
by Maryland Rule 764(b), which allowed the judge to modify a sen-
tence "[£Jor a period of ninety (90) days ... after the imposition of a 
sentence ... or thereafter pursuant to motion filed within such period . .. ."30 
This gave the trial court two available periods within which it could 
modify a sentence: within ninety days without a motion from counsel, 
or "thereafter" as long as a motion was filed within ninety days.31 The 
Robinson court determined that "[t]he term 'thereafter' was open-en-
ded and there is no other reading that can be given it."32 
Present Rule 4-345 (b), and the rule in place when Robinson was de-
cided, reads in pertinent part: "The court has revisory power and con-
trol over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its 
imposition ... ."33 The Robinson court interpreted this rule as taking 
away the judge's power to modify sentences sua sponte, but leaving the 
judge's power to modify pursuant to a timely motion intact without 
any time limitations.34 The court stated that "[t]he second and longer 
time period for modification, triggered by the filing of a motion 
within 90 days, no longer enjoys the presence of the word 'thereafter' 
but is no less open ended."35 
The state recognized that the ninety-day time limit for filing the 
motion might extend into a new term of court, but it argued that the 
judge's power to grant that motion would end upon termination of 
that succeeding term.36 The court rejected the state's argument, 
which would have engrafted a remnant of the old common law rule 
onto the new Rule.37 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not specifically addressed the 
issue of whether there is any time limitation on a judge's power to 
revise a sentence, but it has given its seeming approval to the Robinson 
approach in Greco v. State. 38 In that case, the trial court had granted a 
defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence eight years after impo-
sition of the original sentence.39 The defendant then filed another 
motion to modify within ninety days of the sentence reduction.4o The 
30. Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 723, 666 A.2d at 911; MD. R. 764(b) (1) (1957). 
31. Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 723,666 A.2d at 911. 
32. Id. 
33. CompareMo.R.4-345(b) (2003),withMo.R.4-345(b) (1995). SeealsoRobin-
son, 106 Md. App. at 723, 666 A.2d at 911. The change from Rule 
764(b)(l) to Rule 4-345(b) was made as part of the recodification of the 
Maryland Criminal Rules in 1984. Court of Appeals, Order of Apr. 6, 1984, 
effective July 1, 1984. 
34. Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 723,666 A.2d at 911. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 723-24, 666 A.2d at 911. 
37. Id. at 723-24, 666 A.2d at 911-12. 
38. 347 Md. 423, 701 A.2d 419 (1997). 
39. Id. at 426, 701 A.2d at 420. 
40. Id. 
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actual issue facing the court of appeals was whether the sentence re-
duction should be treated as an imposition of sentence, which would 
allow the defendant ninety days to file a second motionY In holding 
that it was an imposition of sentence, the court at least tacitly ap-
proved the original modification, even though it was eight years after 
the original sentencing.42 
Additionally, the Greco court cited Robinson for the proposition that 
there is no time limit on ajudge's power to modify.43 It also acknowl-
edged that the Rules Committee had considered and rejected a rec-
ommendation that the rule be amended to impose a time limitation 
on the power to modify.44 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, how-
ever, took note of two federal cases in which the court refused to allow 
sentence modification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 35(b), after eighteen and thirty months respectively.45 Neverthe-
less, the court intimated that federal cases were not very helpful when 
interpreting the Maryland rule because of the much more limited 
power given judges under the federal rule. 46 
The Maryland courts' reading of Rule 4-345(b), although reasona-
ble, is not the only plausible interpretation. The appellate courts of 
one state with a rule similar to Maryland's have imposed a duty on the 
trial judge to rule "within a reasonable time after its filing."47 Rule 
35 (b) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure reads, in perti-
nent part: "The court may reduce the sentence provided that a mo-
tion for reduction of sentence is filed ... within 120 days after the 
sentence is imposed .... "48 In Colorado v. Fuqua, the defendant had 
filed a timely motion to modify.49 The trial court, however, "appar-
ently laboring under the notion that its jurisdiction was interminable, 
failed to rule on the motion until approximately eighteen months fol-
lowing the expiration of the 120-day filing period."50 The Supreme 
Court of Colorado held that the sentencing court was under a duty to 
act "within a reasonable period of time," and if it did not so act, then 
it "becomes the defendant's obligation to make reasonable efforts to 
secure an expeditious ruling on the motion."51 If the defendant fails 
41. Id. at 431-32, 701 A.2d at 423. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. at 435, 701 A.2d at 424-25. 
44. See id., at 424-25, 701 A.2d at 435. 
45. [d. at 435-36, 701 A.2d at 425; see also United States v. Taylor, 768 F.2d 114, 
118 (6th Cir. 1985) (questioning whether a delay of eighteen months in 
ruling on a Rule 35(b) motion is reasonable); Diggs v. United States, 740 
F.2d 239, 24~7 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a decision on a Rule 35(b) 
motion was untimely thirty months after sentencing). 
46. See Greco, 347 Md. at 436-37, 701 A.2d at 425-26. 
47. Colo. v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 61 & n.4 (1988). 
48. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1998). 
49. Fuqua, 764 P.2d at 58. 
50. Id. at 61. 
51. Id. 
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to do so, "the motion for reduction should be deemed abandoned."52 
The Colorado court made this ruling based on policy, rather than stat-
utory construction. They held that a timely ruling was necessary to 
give "due deference to the principle of finality," "to relieve the sen-
tenced defendant of needless uncertainty" and to allow "the Depart-
ment of Corrections to structure a suitable program for the inmate 
and assign him to an appropriate correctional facility .... "53 
Until 1984, Federal Rule 35(b) was also similar to Maryland's pre-
sent rule in that it allowed a court to modify a sentence if the defen-
dant had filed a motion to modify within the rule's specified period of 
time-120 days for federal cases and ninety days for Maryland cases. 54 
Although the rule did not contain a time limit on the court's action, 
the appellate courts read a requirement of "within a reasonable time" 
into the rule.55 In 1985, it was amended to contain this explicitly. 56 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Greco v. State, 
placed little weight on the federal cases which read a "reasonable 
time" limit into the federal rule because that rule is quite different 
than Maryland's, giving the judge virtually no opportunity to modify a 
sentence.57 But the court failed to note that those opinions were writ-
ten before the 1985 and 1987 amendments restricting federal judges' 
powers and were interpreting the federal rule when it was much more 
similar to the Maryland rule. 58 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1983) & Advisory Committee's Notes; MD. R. 
4.345(b) (2003) (amended 1992 & 2001). 
55. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b); see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 768 F.2d 114, 
116-17 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing that "a majority of circuits" viewed 
"that the district courts retain jurisdiction for a reasonable time beyond the 
120 day period to consider timely Rule 35 motions"; this view was moot 
after Rule 35 was amended in 1987 to completely take away ajudge's power 
to amend a valid sentence); Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 245 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (holding that a district court has a "reasonable time" to decide a 
Rule 35(b) motion after the 12O-day limit); United States v. Krohn, 700 
F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the district court retainsjuris-
diction for a reasonable time after the expiration of 120 days if a motion to 
reduce a sentence is properly filed within 120 days). But cf United States v. 
Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983), em. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984) 
("LW]e have serious doubts whether a district judge can ever reduce a sen-
tence under Rule 35(b) after the 12O-day time limit has passed."). 
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1985) & Advisory Committee's Notes; see also United 
States v. Hayes, 983 F.2d 78, 80 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Congress 
amended the rule in 1985 in reaction to the court's holding in United States 
v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1983), the pre-1985 version "onlyauthor-
ized District Courts to reduce sentences within 120 days"). The rule was 
amended again in 1987 to repeal the 120-day limit altogether. Hayes, 983 
F.2d at 81. 
57. See 347 Md. 423, 434-37,701 A.2d 419, 424-26 (1997); see also supra note 46 
and accompanying text. 
58. See generally Greco, 347 Md. at 433-35, 701 A.2d at 424. 
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The fact that a judge may act on a motion years after it was filed, 
based on facts that were not in existence-or perhaps even contem-
plated-at the time of the motion, makes the Maryland procedure 
unique, not only in regard to sentence modification but in almost any 
area of the law. Broadly speaking, a motion is a request for a court to 
issue an order. 59 Normally, a motion must state the grounds for why it 
should be granted, based on facts in existence at the time the motion 
is made.60 The motion is usually granted or denied within a reasona-
ble time after being made, based on the facts presented in the motion. 
In some cases, the motion may be held by the court until some later 
part of the judicial process. For example, under Rule 12 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pretrial motions are normally "heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the 
court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred 
until the trial."61 
There are few areas of the law in which final judgments may be 
modified years after being made. With injunctions and other equita-
ble orders, for example, the issuing court retains permanent jurisdic-
tion to modify or dissolve the order.62 This, however, usually must be 
done by motion at the time the modification is requested, showing a 
change in circumstances between the time of its issuance and the time 
the motion is made.63 
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Maryland courts have 
given Rule 4-345 such a broad interpretation. The court was clearly 
influenced by the language of the earlier version that allowed a court 
to modify a sentence "[£Jor a period of ninety (90) days after the im-
position of a sentence ... or thereafter, pursuant to motion filed 
within such period .... "64 Obviously, the drafters of this rule contem-
plated the granting of a motion after the ninety day period and chose 
to use the open-ended term "thereafter," rather than a phrase such as 
"within a reasonable time thereafter."65 It was not, therefore, unrea-
sonable for the Robinson court to interpret the framer's intent of that 
earlier version as setting no time limit on the granting of a motion 
pursuant to a timely motion. The court was further justified in its 
interpretation because the rule's legislative history lacked evidence 
demonstrating a desire to impose such a time limit when the rule was 
modified as part of the 1984 recodification. 66 
59. A motion is a "written or oral application requesting a court to make a 
specified ruling or order." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1031 (7th ed. 1999). 
60. FED. R. CN. P. 7(b), l1(b) (2001). 
61. Id. at 12(d). 
62. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 302 (2000). 
63. Id. § 306. 
64. MD. R. 764(b) (1957). 
65. Id. 
66. See supra note 33. 
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There has been only one amendment to Rule 4-345 since Robinson, 
and that involves not the timing, but the procedure used in sentence 
modification.67 The 2001 amendment requires the State's Attorney to 
"give notice to each victim and victim's representative who has filed a 
Crime Victim Notification Request form" when a sentence reduction 
hearing is to be held.68 The amendment gives each victim, or victim's 
representative, the right to attend and testify at any such hearing.6g 
Additionally, the rule requires the court to make a determination that 
the notice requirements have been complied with before holding the 
hearing.70 Finally, "[i]f the court grants the motion, [it] ordinarily 
shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement setting 
forth the reasons on which the ruling is based."71 
III. THE LAW IN OTHER STATES AND IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 
One of the arguments asserted by critics of Maryland judges' revi-
sory power is that Maryland is the only state that gives judges unfet-
tered discretion, with no time limitation, to modify legally imposed 
sentences.72 It is correct that the overwhelming majority of states give 
the judge one year or less to modify a sentence.73 There are a handful 
of other states that allow longer time periods, but most of those im-
pose strict limitations on the kinds of situations where this power may 
be used. Only two other states seem to have a power as broad, or 
nearly as broad, as in Maryland.74 
Most states allow an illegal sentence (i.e. one that exceeded the 










See MD. R. 4-345 (2003) (amended 2001). Robinson was decided in 1995. 
State v. Robinson, 106 Md. App. 720, 666 A.2d 909 (1995). 
MD. R. 4-345(c). 
Id. 
Id. at 4-345(d). 
Id. 
See Robinson, 106 Md. App. at 724, 666 A.2d at 912 (holding that Rule 4-
345(b) engrafts no time limitation on the period within which ajudge may 
act on a modification, "so long as the triggering condition of the filing of a 
motion within 90 days of the imposition of the sentence has been 
satisfied") . 
See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 
See ALA. CODE § 15-18-8(c) (1995 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the court re-
tains jurisdiction throughout the sentence and may suspend that portion of 
the minimum sentence that remains); HAw. R. PENAL P. 35(b) (2003) (stat-
ing that a motion to reduce a sentence made within ninety days "shall em-
power the court to act on such motion even though the time period has 
expired"). See also infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
Many states have patterned their statutes or rules relating to correction of 
illegal sentences upon former Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, usually using the exact language of the former federal rule. See, e.g., 
DEL. CT. C.P.R. 35(a) (2003) ("Correction of sentence. - The court may 
correct an illegal sentence at any time .... "); MD. R. 4-345 (a) (2003) ("Ille-
gal Sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."). 
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tighter limits on ajudge's power to modify a legally imposed sentence. 
The vast m~ority of states either deny judges any power to modify 
sentences76 or give judges varying time limits between thirty days and 
one year to modify a sentence.77 The most common time limits are 
ninety78 and 12079 days, although five states have a shorter limit,80 and 
eight have either a 180-day or a one-year limit.81 In most states, the 
judge must actually reduce the sentence within the time limit.82 In a 
few states, if the defendant makes a motion to modify within the limit, 
the court has "a reasonable time" thereafter to rule on the motion.83 
Some of the states with a time limit of one year or less allow a longer 
or unlimited time period for modification, but impose severe restric-
tions on its use after the normal time limit expires. For example, in 
both California and Kansas, judges can modify sentences after 120 
days only upon recommendation of the Director of Corrections.84 In 
Delaware, a sentence may be modified after ninety days only in "ex-
76. Those states that do not appear to give trial judges statutory power to re-
duce legal sentences include Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas. 
77. See infra notes 78-81. 
78. Those states with a ninety day limit include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-90-111(b)(l) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003)); Delaware (DEL. CT. C.P.R. 
35(b) (2003)); Minnesota (MINN. R. CRlM. P. 28.05(1), (2) (1995 & Supp. 
2003)); New Mexico (N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-801 (b) (2003)); and Vermont (VT. 
CODE R. 35(b) (1983 & Supp. 2003)). 
79. Those states with a 120 day limit include: California (CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1170(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 2003)); Colorado (COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) 
(1998 & Supp. 2002)); District of Columbia (D.C. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) 
(2003)); Idaho (IDAHO R. CRlM. P. 35 (2003)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-4603(d)(I)-(2) (1995)); North Dakota (N.D. R. CRlM. P. 35(b) 
(2002)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(B) (3)(a) (2001 & Supp. 2003)); 
Rhode Island (R.I. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (2003)); Tennessee (TENN. R. CRlM. P. 
35(b) (2003)); and West Virginia (w. VA. R. CRlM. P. 35(b) (2003)). 
80. Those states with a time limit shorter than ninety or 120 days include: Flor-
ida (FlA. R. CRIM. P. 3.800(c) (1999 & Supp. 2003) (sixty days)); Illinois 
(730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (thirty 
days)); Louisiana (LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 822(A)(I),(C), 
881.1(A) (1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (thirty days)); Massachusetts (MAss. 
R. CRlM. P. 29(a) (2002) (sixty days)); and New Jersey (NJ. R. CRlM. P. 3:21-
10(a) (2003) (seventy-five days)). 
81. Those states with a 180 day or one-year limit include: Alaska (AlAsKA STAT. 
§ 12.55.088(a) (Michie 2002) (180 days)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
1(0 (1997 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-
17(a) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 902.4 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); Oklahoma (OKlA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 982(a)(A) (West 1986 & Supp. 2003) (one year)); South Da-
kota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-31-1 (Michie 1998) (one year)); Wisconsin 
(WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.19(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002) (180 days)); and 
Wyoming (WYo. R. CRlM. P. 35(b) (2003) (one year)). 
82. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
83. See, e.g., D.C. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (2003); 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-
l(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003). 
84. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-4603(e) (1995). 
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traordinary circumstances,"85 and in Indiana after 365 days with ap-
proval of the prosecuting attorney.86 In Wisconsin, where judges by 
statute have up to 180 days to modify sentences,87 the state supreme 
court has held that sentencing courts have the "inherent power" to 
modifY sentences during the entire term of the sentence, but only 
when "new factors" have been shown.88 The Wisconsin courts have 
interpreted "new factor" very narrowly, not encompassing either the 
defendant's rehabilitation,89 or a court's reconsideration of the fair-
ness of the sentence based on a reweighing of the facts known at 
sentencing.90 
Presumably, those states with a short period for modification-120 
days or less-did not intend that it be used either as a reward or a 
response to a defendant's rehabilitation-as it can be and often is 
used in Maryland-because little in the way of rehabilitation could be 
accomplished in such a short time. Rather, the most likely purpose of 
such statutes is to give the defendant an opportunity to ask the judge 
to reconsider the fairness of the original sentence, or to consider addi-
tional information that existed at the time of sentencing but was not 
presented. For example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated: 
"Occasions inevitably will occur where a conscientious judge, after re-
flection or upon receipt of new probation reports or other informa-
tion, will feel that he has been too harsh or has failed to give due 
weight to mitigating factors which properly should have been taken 
into account."91 
In fact, some courts have held that a judge may not consider the 
defendant's behavior during incarceration following the sentence in 
deciding a motion to modify.92 In those states with a one-year limit, 
the modification power might be useful for rehabilitation purposes in 










DEL. CT. C.P.R. 35(b) (2003). 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-17(b) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003). Additionally, 
Indiana does allow sentence modification without approval of the prosecut-
ing attorney where the court could have originally placed the defendant in 
a community corrections program and did not, but later does make such 
placement. Id. (Supp. 2003). 
WIS. STAT. A,'IN. § 973.19(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the 
court shall, within ninety days after a motion to modifY is filed, either deter-
mine the motion or extend the time for doing so by not more than an 
additional ninety days). 
Wis. v. Kluck, 563 N.w.2d 468, 470 (1997). 
Id. at 471. 
Wis. v. Grindemann, 648 N.W.2d 507, 515 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). 
Dist. Attorney for the N. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 172 N.E.2d 245, 250-51 (Mass. 
1961). 
See, e.g., In re Clark, 608 N.E.2d lO60, lO63 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
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Judges in only two other states seem to have the kind of broad pow-
ers given to Maryland judges.93 In Hawaii, pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Rules of Penal Procedure, defendants have ninety days to file a mo-
tion to reduce their sentences.94 Once the motion is made within the 
time period, the court is empowered "to act on such motion even 
though the time period has expired."95 There are no reported cases 
that place a time limit on the court's actions. There are, however, also 
no cases in which an appellate court has specifically approved a sen-
tence reduction long after the ninety day filing limit. In Alabama, 
although a judge may only modify a sentence within thirty days of its 
imposition, the court retains jurisdiction throughout the sentence "to 
suspend that portion of the minimum sentence that remains and 
place the defendant on probation .... "96 Therefore, although Ala-
bama judges have limited power to modify a sentence, they have sig-
nificant and extended powers to have defendants released from 
prison before their sentences are served. 
As this review shows, critics of sentence modification in Maryland 
are correct that Maryland law gives judges some of the broadest, if not 
the broadest, powers to modify sentences of all fifty states. It is one of 
only a handful of states that give judges both the time and discretion 
to use sentence modification as a rehabilitation tool. This unique sta-
tus does not necessarily mean that Maryland law should be changed, 
but probably does put the burden of proof on those supporting the 
practice to show that it has benefits in comparison to the law of other 
states. 
As for federal practice, not surprisingly, federal judges' power to 
modify sentences has been severely curtailed, along with the narrow-
ing of their discretion in original sentencing, with the imposition of 
strict, mandatory guidelines. Until a 1987 amendment, federal judges 
had the power to correct an illegal sentence "at any time," and the 
power to reduce a sentence for any reason sua sponte within 120 days 
or within a reasonable time after 120 days pursuant to a motion filed 
by the defendant within that period.97 That rule was similar to the 
rules now in effect in the majority of states, and in fact, many states' 
rules were patterned after the federal rule. 
93. See ALA. CODE § 15-8-8(c) (1995 & Supp. 2002) (stating that the court re-
tains jurisdiction throughout the sentence and may suspend that portion of 
the minimum sentence that remains); HAW. R. PENAL P. 35(b) (2003) (stat-
ing that a motion to reduce a sentence made within ninety days "shall em-
power the court to act on such motion even though the time period has 
expired"). 
94. HAw. R. PENAL P. 35(b). 
95. Id. 
96. ALA. CODE § 15-18-8(c). 
97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1983); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (2003) & Advi-
sory Committee's Notes. 
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In 1987, at the same time that Congress mandated a sentencing sys-
tem in which judges' discretion in sentencing was narrowed, Federal 
Rule 35 was amended also to curtail significantly federal judges , ability 
to reduce sentences.98 Whereas courts previously had unlimited time 
to correct an illegal sentence, they now are given only seven days to 
"correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or 
other clear error."99 Sentence reduction sua sponte or by motion of 
the defendant for any other reason was completely eliminated. 100 
Other than the ability to correct "errors" within seven days, courts may 
only modify sentences upon motion of the government-usually 
within one year, but with some exceptions-and only if "the defen-
dant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating 
or prosecuting another person."IOI Any sentence reduction under 
this rule must also be in accord with "the Sentencing Commission's 
guidelines and policy statements."102 
In addition to their power under Rule 35, federal judges also have 
the statutory power to reduce sentences in three very limited circum-
stances. 103 The first two may only be done pursuant to a motion by 
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, either for: "extraordinary and 
compelling reasons," or if "the defendant is "at least 70 years of age, 
has served at least 30 years in prison," and "is not a danger to the 
safety of any other person or the community."104 The third way can 
be done by the court sua sponte or upon a motion of the defendant in 
cases where the defendant "has been sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered 
by the Sentencing Commission ... if such a reduction is consistent 
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission."105 
IV. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
In order to best determine if the sentencing revisory power given 
judges is appropriate, it is critical to analyze which theories of punish-
ment are part of a particular sovereign's penology goals, and then see 
if the revisory power meets these goals. Most experts separate the 
goals of punishment into four dominant theories: incapacitation, de-
98. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (a), (b) (2003) & Advisory Committee's Notes. 
99. Id. at 35(a). 
100. See id. at 35(b) & Advisory Committee's Notes. Prior to the 1987 amend-
ment, Rule 35 read, in relevant part, that "[a] motion to reduce a sentence 
may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 
120 days after the sentence is imposed or probation is revoked .... " Id. 
101. Id. at 35(b) (l)(A). 
102. Id. at 35(b)(1)(B). 
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2000). 
104. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
105. Id. § 3582(c) (2). 
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terrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. l06 Each theory needs to be 
completely understood before applied to a system that employs sen-
tencing revision as a tool. 
The first three of these theories are essentially utilitarian in na-
ture. \07 That is, they look primarily to the future and hope to achieve 
a specific goal through the sentence imposed on the defendant. 108 
When a system's sentencing ranges for a defendant are based in whole 
or in part on an individual or combination of these theories, it is mak-
ing a statement regarding future goals for the defendant and others, 
and how it plans to achieve those goals. 109 
The fourth theory, retribution, is only utilitarian by happenstance 
and is instead based upon principles of justice and morality.l1O A sen-
tencing system based on this theory is not primarily concerned with 
the modification or control of the defendant and others' behavior 
through the sentence imposed on the defendant, but instead on 
achieving justice for the government, defendant, and victim. III This 
difference is crucial to the approaches taken by many states 112 and the 
federal government through sentencing tools such as the revisory 
power and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. I 13 
Retribution, often called 'Just deserts" when advocated by those to 
the left of political center, is based upon the principles of justiceY4 
That is, each crime deserves a certain sentence or range of sentences 
that is commensurate with the harm done and the moral blamewor-
thiness of the wrongdoer. 115 A sentence that is substantially harsher 
than that which reflects the seriousness of the crime committed is un-
106. Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme 
Courts Capital Sentencing jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1151, 1154 
(2003). 
107. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT 45 
(1976). See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTRODUCTION 7-8 (1987). 
108. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 11 (1968). 
109. See id. 
110. JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY, RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 21 (1992). SeePacker, supra 
note 108, at 9-10. See generally J.D. Mabbott, Punishment as a Corollary of Rule-
Breaking, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFI-
CATIONS 41 (RudolphJ. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972). 
111. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSO-
PHY LAw 229 (1979); see PACKER, supra note 108, at 37. One commentator 
observed, "[c]onsiderations of justice function as checks on social utility, 
weighing against promoting happiness if in so doing some people must be 
treated unfairly in the process.' MuRPHY, supra, at 150. 
112. See Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative justice in the 
United States, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 413,433 (2002)_ 
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)(2} (A) (2000). 
114. See MURPHY, supra note 110, at 21-23; see also Erik Luna, The Theory and 
jurisprudence of Restorative justice: Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural 
Conception of Restorative justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 205, 255 (2002). 
115. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGER-
OUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985). 
16 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
just and therefore immoral. 116 A punishment that is too light fails to 
address the wrong done, diminishes the gravity of the crime commit-
ted,117 and ultimately erodes the moral compact of a free society. 
Retribution is non-utilitarian in that its purpose is to further justice, 
rather than to achieve a socially useful goal. lIB The utilitarian aspect 
of retribution occurs only in the broadest sense of its purpose. 119 Re-
tributionists believe that when a crime is committed, a wound is in-
flicted on society.120 The only way to salve that wound is to apprehend 
the criminal and sentence him proportionally to the wrong he com-
mitted. 121 But retributionists, unlike utilitarians, do not focus on 
whether the sentence will diminish the likelihood that the offender, 
or a similarly situated person, will harm society again.122 If a sentence 
is proportional to the seriousness of the crime, justice is served and 
the retributionist is satisfied. 123 
Eighteenth-century criminologist Cesare Beccaria was perhaps the 
most influential advocate of justice-based punishments.124 In his 
landmark work, On Crimes and Punishments,125 Beccaria argued that 
punishments should not be based on who the offender was and his 
status in society, but rather on the particular crime that was commit-
ted. 126 Beccaria argued that people must be treated equally by the 
criminal justice system, regardless of their status or background. 127 
116. Id. at 36. See HJ. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 119, 121-22 (Gertrude Ezor-
sky ed., 1972). 
117. TEN, supra note 107, at 159. 
118. MURPHY, supra note 110, at 21. 
119. See id. 
120. See TEN, supra note 107, at 52-53. 
121. MuRPHY, supra note 1l0, at 23. 
122. See generally id. at 21. Immanuel Kant expressed the retributionists' view by 
stating that: 
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to pro-
mote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, 
but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the 
ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can 
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of some-
one else and can never be confused with the objects of the Law of 
things. 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 100 (John Ladd ed. & trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
1965) (1797). 
123. TEN, supra note 107, at 154. C.S. Lewis argued that "the concept of Desert 
is the only connecting link between punishment and justice." C.S. Lewis, 
The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, 
supra note 110, at 195. 
124. Cesare Beccaria, at http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/ crimtheory /beccaria. 
htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). 
125. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 
Prentice Hall 1963) (1764). 
126. Id. at 70. 
127. Id. 
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Fairness and justice had to be the hallmarks of the legal system, and 
this was to be achieved by focusing on the seriousness of the crime 
and not the social status of the offender. 128 Part of Beccaria's ap-
proach to crime was the belief that crime was an act of freewill. 129 
While certain factors increase the likelihood that some people will 
commit crime, the most important consideration is an individual's 
freewill and ability to act with his own volition. 130 As the decision to 
commit a crime is a volitional and immoral one, punishment should 
be based on the degree of moral wrong as well as the seriousness of 
the criminal act itself. 131 
Thus, Beccaria's belief in crime as an act of freewill and moral 
wrong,' combined with his view that punishments should be fair for 
the offender as well as society, led him to be an advocate for retribu-
tion. 132 Beccaria, however, also saw deterrence as a more utilitarian 
goal that could be achieved without excessively skewing the necessary 
proportional relationship between the seriousness of the crime and 
the harshness of the punishment. 133 
There are two types of deterrence that can be used in sentencing: 
special (also referred to as specific) deterrence134 and general deter-
rence.135 Special deterrence seeks to make the price that the defen-
dant will pay in either a fine or imprisonment high enough that he 
will be disinclined to engage in criminal activity again.136 General de-
terrence makes a particular defendant's sentence a tool for modifYing 
the behavior of others who might be contemplating committing a sim-
ilar crime.137 The result is that potential offenders will hear of the 
128. See id. 
129. Id. See also LEON RAnZINOWlCZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 12-13 (1966) (discuss-
ing how this view of crime as the product of freewill makes both retribution 
and deterrence appropriate justifications for punishment). 
130. BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 12-13. 
131. One commentator describes the retributionist's approach that views the 
criminal as a rational actor as: "If he chooses not to sacrifice by exercising 
self-restraint and obedience, this is tantamount to his choosing to sacrifice 
in another way-namely, by paying the prescribed penalty." MuRPHY, supra 
note 1l0, at 47. The criminal is morally responsible for his actions, which, 
to the retributionist,justifies infliction of punishment. TEN, supra note 107, 
at 46. 
132. J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in NICHOLAS N. KITI'RIE & ELYCE H. 
ZEN OFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS: LAw, POLICY, AND PRAC-
TICE 8 (1981); see supra notes II 0-123 (discussing retributionist theories). 
133. BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 62-63; see also supra notes 107-109 (discussing 
utilitarian theory). 
134. J.M. Burns &J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, inKlTI'RIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
12; see also PACKER, supra note 108, at 45. 
135. J.M. Burns &J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITI'RIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
12. 
136. Id.; PACKER, supra note 108, at 45. 
137. J.M. Burns &J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITI'RIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
12; see PACKER, supra note 108, at 39; see also Stanley I. Benn & Richard S. 
Peters, The Utilitarian Case for Deterrence, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, 
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defendant's sentence and will decide that their own possible criminal 
behavior is not worth the punishment, because the price of the pen-
alty is higher than the rewards that flow from the criminal conduct. 138 
Deterrence-based punishments involve one and possibly two neces-
sary elements (depending on whether special or general deterrence is 
the goal), the first somewhat theoretical, the second very practical. 139 
Deterrence theory is based upon the view of crime as a rational act 
and is in line with the work of Beccaria. 140 Beccaria, unlike the posi-
tivists that would follow him, believed that crime was an act of free-
will. 141 He saw crime as the product of the criminal's rational decision 
that the rewards from the crime exceeded the likelihood of being ap-
prehended and successfully prosecuted combined with the severity of 
the possible punishment. 142 Beccaria and his followers believed that 
successful crime control would be achieved by tilting the balance just 
enough so that the criminal viewed the cost of being caught and pun-
ished as greater than the bounty from the crime itself. 143 With respect 
to specific deterrence, the judge should set the punishment just high 
enough to create a significant disincentive for future criminal behav-
ior by the defendant himself.144 Regarding general deterrence, the 
defendant's punishment should be set high enough so others contem-
plating the commission of a similar crime will be frightened by the 
penalty imposed.145 
The second element-communication-is necessary only to 
achieve the goals of general (not specific) deterrence.146 In order for 
others who are thinking of engaging in criminal activity similar to that 
of the defendant to be deterred from doing so, the potential offender 
must be aware of what sentence was handed out in a particular case. 147 
Sometimes a case of particular notoriety achieves this goal because it 
supra note 110, at 96-97; see also United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 
202 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing Jeremy Bentham's espousal of general 
deterrence) . 
138. See BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 62-63; PACKER, supra note 108, at 140; VON 
HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 31-32. 
139. See Course Work, Does Deterrence Work, at http://www.courseworkbank.com. 
uk/coursework/does_deterrence_work_2020/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). 
140. See J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRlE & ZENOFF, supra note 
132, at 8. 
141. See J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 
132, at 8, 10. 
142. See RAOZINOWICZ, supra note 129, at 12. 
143. BECCARIA, supra note 125, at 62-63; Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention: A 
Broader View of Deterrence, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 110, at 
109, 115-16. 
144. See generally BECCARlA, supra note 125, at 42-43; J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, 
Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZEN OFF, supra note 132, at 12. 
145. See PACKER, supra note 108, at 140; RADZINOWICZ, supra note 129, at 10-11; 
VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 32. 
146. J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
13. 
147. Andenaes, supra note 143, at 108-109. 
2003] Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland 19 
receives saturation coverage in the media. Other times, proponents 
of general deterrence hope to get the message out by repeatedly as-
signing appropriate sentences in cases involving certain crimes. 148 
For example, society has come to view driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs far more seriously than in past decades. While no 
one sentence may convey the seriousness with which society now views 
the dangers of this crime, proponents of general deterrence expect 
that when the public repeatedly hears that offenders were given tough 
sentences, others thinking of drinking and driving will not do so out 
of fear of the legal consequences. 149 
In the late-nineteenth century, positivists dominated criminal jus-
tice theory.150 Viewing Enrico Ferri as their intellectual father, the 
positivists were a broadly grouped combination of criminologists and 
others.151 They believed that the decision to engage in criminal activ-
ity was far more than an act of freewill on the part of the offender. 152 
Economic, social, environmental, psychological, anatomical and other 
factors particular to the individual criminal were believed to also play 
a role in the decision to violate the criminal laws.153 The positivists 
thought ignoring these factors when sentencing, was to ignore real-
ity.154 The positivists focused not on the crime, but on the criminal 
himself.155 
This focus resonated from the idea that people commit crimes for 
different reasons, often not of their own making. Therefore, it is both 
wrong and ineffective to give everyone who commits the same offense 
a similar sentence.156 Positivists thought it better to tailor the sen-
tence to fit the offender, which achieves specific goals through the 
sentence. 157 These goals have been refined to incapacitation and 
rehabilitation.158 
Incapacitation is a theory of punishment whose goal is to separate 
offenders from society long enough so that they cannot offend again, 
in order to protect society.159 Generally, sentences based primarily on 
148. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KnTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
12-13. 
149. See generally id. at 12. 
150. See id. at 10; see also U.S. v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192,200 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); K 
Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REv. 277, 312 
n.176 (2001). 
151. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KrrTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
10-11. 
152. Id. at 10-11. 
153. Id. at 11. 
154. See generally id. 
155. See id. at 11, 23. 
156. Id. at 23; see generally KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT, at iii 
(Viking Compass ed., 1969). 
157. See ].M. Burns & ].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KrrTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 
132, at 11. 
158. Id. 
159. TEN, supra note 107, at 8. 
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incapacitation are reserved for the most dangerous of criminals, those 
who exhibit predatory and extremely violent behavior.160 While in-
capacitationists consider the crime committed, they are far more con-
cerned with the criminal and the likelihood of his committing 
another serious offense. 161 Incapacitation, perhaps more than any 
other theory of punishment, requires the sentencer to predict the fu-
ture behavior of the defendant. 162 This is normally done by looking at 
a variety of factors. These include the seriousness of the crime, how 
often in the past the defendant has committed similar crimes, psycho-
logical or other profiles of the offender that offer reasons for his ex-
treme, irrational behavior, and any other clues that might exist 
regarding the offender's future dangerous conduct. 163 Often, these 
factors deprive the offender of the ability to desist from the serious 
and violent criminal behavior he previously exhibited. 
There are many who commit criminal acts who do not need to be 
separated from society for extended periods of time either because 
they are not that dangerous to begin with or because the reasons be-
hind their offenses can be removed or submerged. In one way or an-
other, these individuals can be rehabilitated to the point where they 
will no longer commit criminal acts. Therefore, sentences of incarcer-
ation should be only as long as it takes for the individual to be rehabil-
itated from those elements that caused him to commit the crime.164 
Rehabilitationists believe that the vast majority of criminals commit 
crimes because of something in their psychological make-up, back-
ground, or environment that leads them to offend. 165 
Based in positivist theory, rehabilitationists generally view it as 
wrong to punish based primarily on the act committed and to sen-
tence all similar actors to similar sentences.166 Some rehabilitationists 
see crime as a form of sickness or the result of other sicknesses. 167 As 
with recovery from any disease, different people take different periods 
of time to overcome those things that caused them to offend. 168 If the 
160. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
13. 
161. Id. 
162. VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 104; see also ].M. Burns & ].S. Mattina, Sen-
tencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 24. 
163. VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 105; VON HIRSCH, supra note 107, at 87-88. 
164. ].M. Burns & ].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
11,23. 
165. Matthew A. Pauley, The jurisprudence of Crime and Punishment from Plato to 
Hege~ 39 AM.]. JURIS. 97, 98-99, 108 (1994). 
166. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITrRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
11,23. 
167. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and judi-
cial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORD-
HAM URB. LJ. 2063, 2077 (2002); see generally MENNINGER, supra note 156 
(discussing the notion of crime as a sickness). 
168. ].M. Burns &].S. Mattina, Sentencing, in KITTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 132, at 
23. 
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defendant is a substance abuser, perhaps his involvement in a drug or 
alcohol program would remove his need to commit crimes. If the 
problem is psychological, then counseling may be needed to deal with 
the source of the offender's criminal behavior. If the problem is envi-
ronmental, then a more positive environment needs to be created for 
the offender. Sometimes that means merely changing the people and 
groups with whom he interacts by moving him to a different location. 
The source of the criminal behavior could also be economic. Perhaps 
a basic education or vocational training would eliminate the crimi-
nal's need to steal or burglarize because he would have a better 
chance of finding a job. The proponents of rehabilitation theory be-
lieve that it is a combination of some or all of these conditions that 
lead to the defendant's criminal behavior.169 
Whatever the cause of the behavior, however, rehabilitationists 
place their focus not on the offense committed as much as on what is 
needed to treat the offender and make it less likely that he will offend 
again. 170 Because every individual progresses at a different pace to-
ward recovery, rehabilitationists find it illogical to set all sentences for 
a particular crime at the same or similar levels of punishment. Addi-
tionally, these individual differences make it impossible to gauge at 
the time of sentencing just how long it will take each offender to 
achieve the goals of rehabilitation. 
Most judges, if asked, will say they use a combination of the above 
theories or utilize different theories in different cases. 171 Although 
this may be true, such a claim should not be allowed to blur the differ-
ence in a sentence depending on the predominant theory used by the 
judge in a particular case. 
One example would be when a man finds his spouse in bed with 
another man grabs a shotgun and shoots the spouse to death. This 
man has no criminal record and no history of such behavior. A judge 
placing greatest emphasis on incapacitation might say that this man is 
unlikely to pose a danger to the community and, therefore, sentence 
him to relatively little time in jail. Similarly, the rehabilitationist 
might not sentence the defendant to a prison term because the defen-
dant only needs to work on anger management in extreme situations. 
Proponents of deterrence may regard the defendant's remorse and 
history as signs that he does not need a long prison sentence to be 
persuaded not to commit such an act again. Additionally, general de-
terrence based sentencers might focus on how much the shooting was 
169. Adam Lamparello, Reaching Across Legal Boundaries: How Mediation Can Help 
the Criminal Law in Adjudicating "Crimes Addition, " 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
REsoL. 335, 360 (2001). 
170. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the Con-
stitutionality and Utility of State Statutvry Responses to the Problem of Hate Crimes, 
39 S.D. L. REv. 1,42 & n.239 (1994). 
171. See infra Part VI.B. 7-8. 
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purely reactive versus how much it was planned. If the latter, the 
crime is more suited to a deterrence-based sentence. The more 
thought that goes into a criminal act the more likely it is that the 
offender can be persuaded not to commit such an act in the future by 
making the penalty for the . current crime very harsh. Advocates of 
general deterrence will sentence the defendant according to how 
strongly they believe the message must unequivocally resonate that 
such shootings will not be excused or minimized because of the cir-
cumstances involved. 
Retributionist sentencers may impose a much different sentence 
than the utilitarian-based sentencers discussed above. A judge with 
retributionist views might consider some of the factors used by other 
groups, including incapacitation, rehabilitation and deterrence, but 
ultimately he would likely still punish the defendant severely for the 
crime committed. This is because a judge relying primarily on retri-
bution theory would not wish to deprecate the seriousness of taking a 
human life and, therefore, impose a heavy sentence on the defendant. 
Often, a sentence based in retribution theory is harsher than one 
that looks for guidance to the utilitarian theories, but also the oppo-
site is true on many occasions. 172 One case that reached the Supreme 
Court that involved such a sentence was Hutto v. Davis. 173 The case 
involved Roger Davis, who was convicted in Virginia of the crimes of 
possession and possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of ma-
rijuana. 174 He was originally sentenced, by a jury and approved by the 
trial judge, to twenty years in prison on each charge, which ran con-
secutively.175 In other words, Davis got forty years in prison for of-
fenses involving nine ounces of marijuana. 176 This sentence was 
thirteen times longer than the average for defendants in Virginia who 
were convicted of similar offenses at the time. 177 When Davis was sen-
tenced, the jury took into consideration a number of personal factors 
of the defendant. 178 The jury concluded Davis was a poor candidate 
for rehabilitation and determined that he needed to be deterred by a 
long sentence or incapacitated, lest he do other anti-social things. 179 
A retribution-based sentence would require a relationship between 
the seriousness of the crime and the length of prison time given the 
172. See Paul Butler, By Any M~ans Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to 
Change Unjust Law, 50 VClA L. REv. 721, 757 n.159 (2003). 
173. Hutto v. Davis, 454 V.S. 370 (1982). 
174. [d. at 370. 
175. [d. at 371. 
176. [d. 
177. Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (W.D. Va. 1977). 
178. See Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1228 (4th Cir. 1978). 
179. See Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme 
Court's Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. LJ. 107, 
120-21 nn.80, 87, 88 (1996). 
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defendant. Such a requirement would surely rule out a sentence of 
forty years for the crimes of which Davis was convicted. 
Although the length of sentences can vary greatly depending on the 
predominant theory of punishment used by the sen tencer, so too can 
the entire structure of a sentencing system turn on which punishment 
theories have the greatest influence on the criminal justice system. 
During the middle of the twentieth century, the utilitarian theories of 
punishment were used in most, if not all, American penal systems. lSO 
One result of this focus, particularly on rehabilitation and incapacita-
tion, was the common use of the indeterminate prison sentence. lSI 
The distinguishing feature of the indeterminate sentence is that at 
the time the judge issues the sentence, it is largely uncertain just how 
much time the defendant will actually be incarcerated. Is2 By contrast, 
a completely fixed sentence sets the duration of prison time at the 
instance the sentence is issued. The indeterminate sentence is consis-
tent with the rehabilitation and incapacitation models of punishment 
because each of those theories looks primarily to the offender rather 
than the offense committed. Is3 Indeterminate sentences condition 
the length of incarceration on the amount of time the defendant 
needs to be separated from society so he no longer poses a serious 
danger or the time it will take him to become rehabilitated. I84 As the 
length of time it takes to achieve these results varies with the individ-
ual offender, it is very difficult for the judge at the time of sentencing 
to determine how long a period of time the defendant needs to be 
incarcerated to achieve the desired results. Therefore, for a judge 
whose primary sentencing goals are either incapacitation or rehabili-
tation, it is better to wait and see how the individual defendant is pro-
gressing before deciding when he should be released. ls5 
While in theory sentences can be completely fixed (ten years in 
prison) or completely indeterminate (a period of time from one day 
to life to be decided later by the appropriate authorities), they are 
almost always neither completely fixed nor entirely indeterminate. 
During the mid-twentieth century, sentences were far more indetermi-
nate and the range of minimum and maximum sentences far greater 
than they are today.lS6 In California, for example, most of those con-
180. See generally Symposium, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Re-
tributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1411, 1422-23 (2002). 
181. [d. 
182. See Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. L. 
REv. & WOMEN'S STUD. 255, 279 (1996). 
183. Symposium, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways 
Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 139, 178-79 (2000). 
184. See Barry C. Field, Race, Politics, & Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the 
Conservative "Backlash,» 87 MINN. L. REv. 1447, 1504-05 (2003). 
185. See infra Part VI.D. 
186. See Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How 
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 
40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 87, 89-90 (2003). 
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victed of a felony were sentenced from a one-year incarceration to a 
period of time to be determined by the parole authority.187 Maryland 
sentenced some offenders to the Patuxent Institution where their re-
lease date was determined primarily by how well they were rehabili-
tated while in the Institution. 188 Even in more standard systems of 
punishment, it was common to have sentences whose possible statu-
tory ranges were wide (Le., no minimum and twenty-five years maxi-
187. See, e.g., In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 3-4 (1976). The defendant in In re Grant 
was convicted for the sale of marijuana and sentenced to state prison for 
ten years to life without the possibility of parole before ten years because of 
his prior narcotics conviction. Id. The defendant sought a writ of habeas 
corpus stating that his minimum period for parole eligibility constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 4-5. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia directed the Adult Authority as follows: 
"[T]o grant parole consideration to [the defendant] ... without 
regard to the provisions of [the] former [statute]," because it con-
stituted both cruel and unusual punishment, based on its over-
breadth in absolutely prohibiting parole for substantial periods of 
time without regard to the gravity of the particular offense, the na-
ture of the offender, or the existence of possible mitigating 
circumstances. 
Id. at 16-18; see also In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d. 410, 413-14 (1972). The defen-
dant inmate in In re Lynch applied for writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme 
Court of California contending that the indeterminate sentence, which was 
imposed by the California trial court as the aggravated penalty for second-
offense indecent exposure, was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Under 
the recidivist provision of section 314 [of the California Penal Code], de-
fendant had been sentenced to prison for an indeterminate term, with a 
maximum life sentence. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1999). The Su-
preme Court of California granted the writ and ordered the defendant dis-
charged from custody, and held that the particular indeterminate sentence, 
imposed pursuant to section 314, was unconstitutional because of the un-
reasonably high maximum term. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d. at 438-39; CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 314. The Court held that "when a defendant under an 
indeterminate sentence challenges that sentence as cruel or unusual pun-
ishment ... the test is whether the maximum term of imprisonment per-
mitted by the statute punishing his offense exceeds the constitutional limit, 
regardless of whether a lesser term may be fixed in his particular case." In 
re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d. at 419. 
188. See, e.g., Dir. of Patuxent Inst. v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966). 
In Dir. of Patuxent Inst., the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the 
defendant had to be released from the Patuxent Institution because the 
defendant had been referred to the Institution for a diagnosis of possible 
defective delinquency. Id. at 24, 221 A.2d at 402. The court held that a 
person cannot be referred to the Institution until one or more of the five 
prerequisites of conviction for a specified crime existed. Id. The Maryland 
Defective Delinquent Act was established to protect society from persons 
who show a "propensity toward criminal activity." Id. at 32, 221 A.2d at 406. 
The Institution focuses on confinement and treatment in the means of re-
habilitation, rather than punishment and deterrence. See id. The court in 
this case, however, found that the defendant had none of the prerequisites 
when he was referred and the county that referred the defendant erred in 
doing so because only the sentencing court could refer the defendant. Id. 
at 24, 221 A.2d at 402. 
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mum) and judges who frequently sentenced defendants to prison 
terms with wide ranges (i.e., five to fifteen years).189 
Attacks on the indeterminate sentencing system from both the 
leftl90 and the right in the later half of the twentieth century resulted 
in far more determinate sentences. 191 The ranges of sentences were 
markedly reduced l92 and the focus of sentencing was on the crime 
more than the criminal. 193 Rehabilitation became a secondary con-
cern in many punishment systems or even a non-existent one in 
some.194 Foremost among these systems was the one adopted by the 
federal government.195 
In 1984, Congress approved the formation of a new and radically 









See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938,1941-42 (1988). 
The left argued that they were unfair, discriminatory, and rewarded con-
formity in the institution rather than true rehabilitation. JESSICA MITFORD, 
KIND AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 91-92 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1973). Ms. 
Mitford launches a withering attack on California's system of indeterminate 
punishments and the many unjust results it produces. See id. See also Kate 
Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 227 (1993). 
The right argued that they resulted in the release of dangerous criminals 
too early, rewarded inmates who were good at playing the game, led to too 
much sentencing disparity among those who committed the same crime, 
and focused too much on rehabilitating the criminal without sufficient con-
cern for the harm to the victim and the seriousness of the crime. Stith & 
Koh, supra note 190, at 228; see also Jonathan D. Casper, Determinate Sentenc-
ing and Prison Crowding in Illinois, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 231, at 234-35 (1984). 
See Weinstein, supra note 186, at 91-92 (regarding federal sentencing guide-
lines); see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other 
States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT. R. 69, 
Part ILA-B. (1999). 
See Stith & Koh, supra note 190, at 284 (explaining that the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines "view the relevancy of personal characteristics with 
skepticism") . 
See Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1953. Rehabilitation was one of the factors 
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to consider, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) (2000), but as Charles Ogletree notes, the Commission decided 
to consider rehabilitation and personal factors only in determining 
whether a sentence fits within the guidelines. Id. In his view, "[a] system 
that fails to consider the offender's personal characteristics places too great 
an emphasis on the harm caused by the offender's act and too little empha-
sis on circumstances that would serve to mitigate the punishment." Id. at 
1953-54. 
Although rehabilitation was one of the stated goals of the federal sentenc-
ing system, the Guidelines "failed to achieve a proper balance of the four 
theories of punishment, favoring retribution and general deterrence, and 
relegating rehabilitative efforts to those convicted of only the least severe 
crimes." Karin Bornstein, 5K2. 0 Departures for 5H Individual Characteristics: A 
Backdoor Out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 
135,160 (1992). 
Orrin A. Hatch, The Rnle of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing 
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and 
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 187-88 (1993). 
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system was established that placed greatest emphasis on the crime 
committed and only looked to a small number of personal factors of 
the criminal, most of which were fairly objective in nature. 197 The 
systemic goal was to reduce almost entirely disparities in sentencing, 
thus ensuring that those who committed similar crimes received simi-
lar sentences. 19B Judges were given far less sentencing discretion both 
as to the range of their sentences and what factors they could use to 
govern their sentencing determinations.199 While most states have 
not adopted stringent mandatory guidelines like those adopted by the 
federal government, many states have substantially changed their sen-
tencing systems to limit the range of sentences and reduce their 
indeterminacy.200 
Maryland, in limiting its range of sentences, establishing certain 
mandatory minimum sentences, adopting permissive sentencing 
guidelines, and creating sentencing review panels, has followed the 
national trend away from indeterminacy in sentencing and toward 
some limitation on judicial discretion. Unlike the federal govern-
ment, however, Maryland still proclaims rehabilitation to be one of 
the primary goals of sentencing.201 Furthermore, the guidelines that 
exist in the state are only advisory and are not followed by the judges 
in about half the cases before them.202 
These differences in sentencing philosophy and structure are most 
significant when it comes to assessing the appropriateness of sentenc-
ing revision. In the federal system in which parole has been abol-
ished, where rehabilitation is not a primary goal of sentencing, and 
curtailing disparity is a raison d'etre, to allow judges to revise sentences 
would seem to be anathema.203 Sentencing revision is done most 
often to foster the goal of rehabilitation, and it can often result in 
offenders who committed the same crime, receiving markedly differ-
197. Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1949-50; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). 
198. See Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerg;ing Departure 
jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 
1,3-5 (1991); see also Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Cen-
tury, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1,8-9 (1987); Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1938-39. 
199. See Robinson, supra note 198, at 2-3; Ogletree, supra note 189, at 1947, 1953. 
200. Kevin R. Reitz, ALI, Modern Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REv. 525, 557-58 (2002). At the end of the twentieth century, fif-
teen states were operating with sentencing guidelines and seven states had 
"entered active study processes moving toward such a framework." Id. 
201. State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992) (citing 
Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 540, 336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975». 
202. MD. STATE COMM'N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, ANNUAL REpORT 4 
(2002), available at http://www.msccsp.org/publications/ar2002.pdf. After 
falling below fifty percent in 1999 and 2000, the rate of judicial compliance 
with the guidelines rose to 50.9% in 2001. Id. at 7. 
203. See Joseph S. Hall, Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on 
Indigent Defendants and Public Defense, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1331, 1342 
(1999). 
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ent sentences.204 But in a sentencing scheme like Maryland's, al-
lowing judges to adjust sentences after seeing how the offender is 
progressing in his efforts to deal with the problems that led him to 
offend, can greatly further the goal of rehabilitation. 
V. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST REVISORY POWER 
The wisdom and fairness of giving judges the power to modify 
sentences is the subject of much controversy among those involved in 
the criminal justice system. The most vocal critics of judges' power to 
reduce sentences have been prosecuting attorneys,205 victims' rights 
activists206 and some state legislators.207 Some of the critics are com-
pletely opposed to the practice of judicial sentence modification, 
while others would like to see a one-year time limit imposed, or the 
practice restricted to only non-violent crimes. The strongest support-
204. See Reitz, supra note 200, at 528. 
205. See Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. The bill 
to place a time limit on judges' revisory power was supported by the States' 
Attorneys Association and by many individual state's attorneys. See id. 
Montgomery County State's Attorney Douglas Cansler stated, "[t]he whole 
concept of reconsideration is institutionalized hoodwinking of the public 
.... " [d. Chief Felony Prosecutor for Prince George's County, Robert L. 
Dean, stated that" [reconsideration is] kind of the dirty little secret of the 
criminal justice system." Id. Although most prosecutors oppose the prac-
tice of sentence revision and would like to see it abolished or limited, our 
survey found that judges reported that a majority of motions for sentence 
reduction were not opposed by the prosecution. See infra Part VI.B.5. 
206. See, e.g., Christian Davenport & Maureen O'Hagan, Prosecutors Back Limits on 
Sentence Reductions, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at T3. Sheri DePetro, Execu-
tive Director of the STTAR center (a Howard County nonprofit that serves 
victims of sex crimes and child abuse) stated that giving judges the power to 
"reduce [offenders'] sentences makes a mockery of our criminal justice sys-
tern .... " [d. See also Katherine Shaver & Christian Davenport, Second Looks 
at Sentencing; Duncan, Gansler Support Limits, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at 
T3. Michaele Cohen, Executive Director of the Maryland Network Against 
Domestic Violence stated that "she wants to ensure that victims are notified 
when a judge is asked to reduce their attacker's sentence." [d. See also 
Roberta Roper, Editorial, Del. Vallario: For Victim s Rights, WASH. POST, Feb. 
17,2001, at A30. Roberta Roper formed the Stephanie Roper Committee 
with the goal of changing the laws that address victims rights. See also 
STANDING COMM. ON R. OF PRAGTICE & PROC., MINUTES OF R. COMM., at 8-9 
(Mar. 9, 2001), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/3-9-Ol.pdf 
[hereinafter STANDING COMM.]. Robert L. Dean, Esq., member of the 
Criminal Subcommitee, stated that "[v]ictims of crime are upset when the 
sentence of the defendant is reduced." [d. at 6. 
207. See, e.g., LeDuc, supra note 9, at C5. Del. Anthony Brown, "prompted by his 
outrage over ajudge reducing the sentence of [a double murderer]," spon-
sored legislation to limit a judge'S power to reconsider sentences. [d. See 
also Lori Montgomery, Maryland House Rejects Limits on Judges: Delegates Ap-
prove Study of Resentencing After Panel's Unannounced Meeting, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 22, 2001, at B2. "Sen. Christopher Van Hollen,Jr. (D) vowed to press 
ahead with a Senate bill to set a one-year limit on reconsiderations .... " [d. 
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ers of the practice are various state judges,208 along with the criminal 
defense bar209 and their supporters in the legislature.210 Many judges 
oppose any limitation on their revisory power, although some judges 
are not opposed to a time limitation. They believe, however, it should 
be two or three years, rather than the one-year limit proposed in the 
state bill.211 
The argument most frequently advanced by opponents of sentence 
modification is that the convicted criminal is getting a benefit he or 
she does not deserve.212 After receiving all the protections of due pro-
cess and being sentenced by a judge considering all relevant matters, 
the right to sentence revision offers the defendant a second chance to 
obtain a favorable sentence.213 Allowing the convicted criminal this 
second chance takes away from the finality of the process214 and de-
208. See, e.g., Daniel LeDuc, Townsend Invigorates Battle Over Judges' Sentencing 
Power; Lt. Governor Backs Measure to Limit Ability to Reduce Terms, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 6, 2002, at B2. The Maryland Conference of Circuit Judges voted 
unanimously in 2002 to oppose the bills to limit the judges' revisory power. 
Id. See also Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. 
Chief Judge Robert M. Bell of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, stated that 
Marylandjudges "generally oppose [proposals to limit discretion]." Id. Nu-
merous state judges have spoken out against limiting the judges power. Id. 
A few judges, however, have supported the one-year limitation. See also Le-
Duc, supra note 9. Retired Court of Appeals Judge John F. McAuliffe, a 
member of the Rules Committee, favors a one-year limit while acknowledg-
ing that the majority of judges favor "the status quo." Id. 
209. See, e.g., Manuel Roig-Franzia & Matthew Mosk, Resentencing Debated in Legal 
Community, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at T3. Criminal Defense Attorney T. 
Joseph Touhey stated, "it would be a mistake to impose strict sentencing 
guidelines, such as those employed in federal criminal cases." Id. See also 
Davenport & O'Hagan, supra note 206. Carol Hanson, Director of the 
Howard County Public Defender's Office, believes a judge's reconsidera-
tion power does have benefits, "especially when a drug offender has been 
rehabilitated." See id. 
210. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Miller Kills Bill to Curb Judges' Power, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 28, 2002, at B1. "Senate President Mike V. Miller Jr. killed a bill that 
would have limited the power of Maryland judges to lower criminal 
sentences." Id. Del. Joseph F. VallarioJr., Chairman of the HouseJudiciary 
Committee, "has opposed efforts to restrict the use of sentencing reconsid-
eration." See Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. 
211. See, e.g., STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 12-13. Judge Ellen Heller 
stated, "[i]f there is a two- or three-year period for these individuals to sat-
isfy their probation and get out of the system, they may be able to stay off 
drugs and became [sic] productive citizens." Id. 
212. See generally Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. 
213. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-102 (2001). It could be argued that this is 
a third chance in that any person sentenced to more than two years impris-
onment has a right to have the sentence reviewed by a threejudge panel. 
Id. 
214. See LeDuc, supra note 208. "Citizens need to have confidence that a sen-
tence really has meaning and finality." Id. 
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prives victims of the closure to which they are entitled.215 Addition-
ally, by sentencing defendants to a term of imprisonment and then 
later modifying the sentence to allow them their freedom earlier, the 
criminal justice system takes away from the notion of truth in sentenc-
ing.216 Thus, the possibility of sentence modification well into the de-
fendant's serving of his sentence is said to erode confidence in a 
system that seems always to be struggling to maintain even the barest 
level of public confidence.217 
While the power to revise sentences does take away from the finality 
of the original sentence, such finality would not be present in any 
event because of the possibility of pardon or executive clemency. 
Most prominent in creating this uncertainty as to how much time a 
defendant will ultimately serve is the possibility of parole. 
Incarcerated defendants in Maryland have the possibility of ob-
taining parole after serving one-quarter of their original sentences,218 
or in cases of "violent crimes,"219 one-half of their sentences.220 The 
members of the parole board, using statutory factors221 and their own 
personal assessments of each inmate, determine whether the defen-
dant will be released the first time he is eligible for parole or at any of 
several other junctures during his time in prison.222 Victims are rarely 
told of this possibility when the sentence is imposed, and even if they 
are, the uncertainty is still present.223 Therefore, if by finality for vic-
tims, it is meant that they will know at the time of sentencing how long 
215. See generally LeDuc, supra note 20S. Senate Judicial Proceedings Chairman 
Walter M. Baker stated that "[t]here should be some closure to the victims' 
families." Id. 
216. Id. Former Lieutenant Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend testified at 
a Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing that "[c]itizens raised concerns 
about truth in sentencing .... We need to maintain public confidence in 
our judiciary." Id. 
217. See generally id. At a meeting of the Maryland Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, member Roger Titus stated to the Committee that he 
was "troubled by the public's lack of confidence in the courts." STANDING 
COMM., supra note 206, at IS. "The whole concept of reconsideration is 
institutionalized hoodwinking of the public, the press and victims of crime 
. . .. This is the type of procedure that breeds cynicism among the public 
in the justice system." Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, 
supra note 5, at Al (interviewing Montgomery County State's Attorney 
Douglas Gansler). 
21S. Mo. CODE ANN., CaRR. SERVo § 7-301 (a)(l)(ii) (1999). 
219. Mo. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw, § 7-101(m) (2002 & Supp. 2003). For the pur-
poses of the parole statute, "violent crimes" are defined as those in section 
14-lO1 of the Criminal Law Subject section of the Maryland Annotated 
Code and burglary in the first, second, or third degree. Id.; see also MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 14-101 (a) (2002). 
220. Mo. CODE ANN., CaRR. SERVo § 7-301 (c). 
221. Id. § 7-301 (defining at what time an inmate is eligible for parole). 
222. See infra Part VI.B.S (describing factors considered when determining 
whether the defendant will be eligible for parole). 
223. See generally Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. 
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the defendant will be incarcerated, such finality will not be achieved 
with or without sentence revision. 
Until 2001, the Maryland Rules did not require that victims be noti-
fied when an inmate had an approaching modification hearing, which 
often closed the door to having the victim's views expressed through 
the prosecution.224 Wisely, the Rules were amended to require that 
victims be notified when a hearing will be held on the defendant's 
request to have his sentence reduced.225 
In order to foster public confidence in the system,226 and to make 
the process "more open,"227 the Rule was amended to require judges 
making sentence modifications to do so "only on the record in open 
court, after hearing from the defendant, the State, and from each vic-
tim or victim's representative who requests an opportunity to be 
heard."228 The judge is also required to "file or dictate into the re-
cord a statement setting forth the reasons on which the ruling is 
based."229 
Critics of sentencing modification argue that the power to alter the 
sentence once it has been imposed by the judge, and held valid by an 
appellate court, resides with the executive branch of the govern-
ment.230 The traditional methods for sentence modification-parole, 
224. Compare MD. R. 4-345 (2001) with MD. R. 4-345 (2003). 
225. MD. R. 4-345(c) (2003). The Rule was amended, effective January 1, 2002, 
to require that the State's Attorney give notice to victims or their represent-
atives of the filing of or hearings on a motion to modify sentence. Id. It 
also gives them the right to testify at any such hearing. Id. Rule 4-435(c) 
reads: 
Notice to Victims. The State's Attorney shall give notice to each 
victim and victim's representative who has filed a Crime Victim No-
tification Request form pursuant to Code, Criminal Procedure Arti-
cle, § 11-104 or who has submitted a written request to the State's 
Attorney to be notified of subsequent proceedings as provided 
under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-503 that states (1) 
that a motion to modify or reduce a sentence has been filed; (2) 
that the motion has been denied without a hearing or the date, 
time, and location of the hearing; and (3) if a hearing is to be held, 
that each victim or victim's representative may attend and testify. 
Id. Of course, this raises a different problem-that participation in the 
hearing will be emotionally difficult for the victim or victim's family. One 
family member of a victim, following a hearing on the killer's request for 
sentence modification, stated: "Mter it's all supposed to be over, you're get-
ting slapped again .... It's torture to put people through that." Montgom-
ery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. 
226. See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 11-12, lB. 
227. See generally Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5, at 
AI. 
228. MD. R. 4-345(d). 
229. Id. 
230. See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at B. Robert Dean, a Prince George's 
County prosecutor and Rules Committee member, stated that "[t]he reten-
tion of control by a judge over the sentence blends the judicial function 
into the executive function, and [it] is not healthy." Id. 
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pardon and clemency-are all functions of the executive branch.231 
Parole, in part because of its applicability to almost all defendants, is 
said to be the appropriate vehicle for taking into consideration the 
kinds of factors that judges often use when modifying sentences.232 
Critics of sentencing modification question whether judges should 
have the power to usurp parole boards, thereby, creating an added 
mechanism by which defendants may have their sentences reduced.233 
Sentencing modification advocates respond to critics by providing 
evidence that parole is an ineffective and inadequate means of deter-
mining which inmates should be released early and how soon into 
their sentences this release should occur. 234 They cite evidence that 
the parole system in Maryland is overwhelmed by as many as 22,000 
cases a year.235 The large number of cases makes it difficult for the 
Parole Commission to give each case in-depth consideration.236 Most 
parole hearings are held by video conferencing, which results in 
neither the hearing examiner nor the parole board ever meeting the 
inmate.237 
Some people feel that the parole system is too sensitive to political 
pressures.238 Governors may not want to release even deserving in-
mates for fear of being labeled "soft on crime," which would be a seri-
ous political liability.239 For example, former Governor Glendening 
refused even to consider parole for any defendant given a life sen-











Id. "There are instances where sentences should be adjusted, but this 
should be handled by the executive branch of government. Executive 
power includes parole, clemency, and pardons." Id. 
Compare supra Part VI.B.8 (identifying criteria that judges use in modifying 
sentences), with MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERV., § 7-305 (1999) (identifying 
factors and information to be considered during parole hearings). 
See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 8. In an interview with the Wash-
ington Post, Anne Arundel County State's Attorney Frank Weathersbee 
stated that 'Judges have been undercutting the authority of the parole 
board." Roig-Franzia & Mosk, supra note 209, at T3. 
See STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7-8 (statement of Committee Mem-
ber Tim Maloney). 
Id. at 7. 
Id. 
Id. Maryland Correctional Services Code section 7-304(e) "does not limit 
the authority of the Commission to hold a parole hearing through the use 
of a video conference or other means of electronic transmission." MD. 
CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS., § 7-304(e). The Maryland Parole Commission 
has chosen to conduct the majority of parole hearings this way. Interview 
with Phillip Dantes, former Chairman, Maryland Parole Commission (May 
15,2003). 
Lester Welch, Editorial, Politics of Parole Boards, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, 
at B6. 
See Lori Montgomery, Lawmaker Seeks to Expand Judges' Power, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 15, 2001, at B4. 
Id. Persons given life sentences may be eligible for parole after either fif-
teen or twenty-five years, and such parole is contingent on "the approval of 
the Governor." MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS, § 7-301 (d). 
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life sentences with and without the possibility of parole, contemplates 
that those sentenced to life with the possibility of parole would at least 
have their cases reconsidered at some time.241 The Honorable Joseph 
Murphy, Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
views this kind of situation as one argument for retaining a judge's 
power to modifY: "People otherwise eligible for parole are suddenly 
no longer eligible. . . . Well, a judge might want to make an adjust-
ment for that."242 
In part because of these reasons and in part beyond them, advo-
cates of sentence revision maintain that judges are far better posi-
tioned to determine which convicted persons should have their 
sentences modified and specifically what forms these modifications 
should take.243 In contrast to the parole board, judges see the defend-
ants personally and often get to know them in a manner different 
than that of the parole board.244 As several judges indicated in the 
Survey conducted in co~unction with this Article, judges are better 
able to gauge and keep track of the progress, or lack thereof, that an 
offender is making to deal with the root causes of his offense.245 Addi-
tionally, judges have far better knowledge of the crime itself, includ-
ing the degree of culpability of the defendant, the role of the victim, 
the seriousness of any injury or loss, and the attitude of the defendant 
at the time of the crime. 
Nonetheless, due to the problems that critics see as arising from the 
lack of finality created by sentence revision, some advocates want to 
place a time limit on how long after imposition of the original sen-
tence a modification request could be heard. Specifically, some Mary-
land state legislators and prosecutors have proposed a one-year 
limitation.246 Supporters of sentence revision respond to this by as-
serting that a one year, or any fixed time period, is often not long 
enough to determine whether an offender has been rehabilitated and 
241. See Montgomery, supra note 239, at B4. In Lomax v. Warden, an inmate serv-
ing a life sentence, and who had been recommended for parole by the 
Commission, challenged Glendening's policy as an ex post facto law in viola-
tion of Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution and 
Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 356 Md. 569, 572, 741 
A.2d 476, 478 (1999). The court denied his challenge, holding that the 
Governor's announcement of a policy on how he was likely to exercise dis-
cretion was not a "law" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibi-
tions. Id. at 577, 741 A.2d at 481. 
242. Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5, at AI. 
243. STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7-8. 
244. Id. 
245. See discussion infra Part VI. 
246. See Montgomery, supra note 210, at B7. This was the proposed limitations 
period in S.B. 73 and H.B. 61, which were rejected during the 2002 legisla-
tive session. Id. In an effort to gain support, the Senate bill was amended 
to raise the period to fifteen months. Id. This bill was approved by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee but withheld from a full Senate vote by Senate 
President Mike Miller. Id. 
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is deserving of sentence modification.247 Individuals progress at dif-
ferent paces, depending, for example, on whether they are engaged 
in educational, therapeutic, vocational or psychological programs.248 
No one fixed time period fits all. Additionally, some programs are not 
available to offenders until they have served a certain amount of their 
sentence and other programs may have a waitlist that extends beyond 
a year or more.249 
Another systemic argument advanced by opponents of the sentenc-
ing revision power is that modifYing sentences creates disparity among 
judges regarding the sentences of individuals who commit the same or 
similar crimes.25o It is the view of most observers of the criminal jus-
tice system that disparity in sentencing practices creates unfairness in 
the system, which adds to the public perception of the entire criminal 
justice system as being unfair. 251 This perception has real conse-
quences when it comes to matters such as funding and the degree of 
cooperation victims and witnesses are willing to provide in criminal 
cases. 
Judges in Maryland, as in most other states, have great discretion 
within prescribed statutory limits regarding the sentence to be im-
posed.252 To deal with the problem of sentencing disparity, Maryland 
has guidelines that are intended to encourage judges to sentence in a 
similar manner and that provide three judge panels to which the de-
fendant can appeal his or her sentence.253 These guidelines, however, 
247. STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7 (describing statement of Committee 
member Tim Malony). 
248. [d. at 12-14 (describing a statement made by Judge Ellen M. Heller). 
249. [d. at 11-13. 
250. See id. at 8. Robert Dean, a member of the Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, stated that "UJudges vary remarkably-some rule immedi-
at~ly,; some hold the case for a long time. This scattered approach is cha-
otIc. [d. 
251. See Montgomery & LeDuc, Loopholes, supra note 5, at AI. 
252. State v. Dopowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992) ("At the 
outset we note that a sentencing judge in a criminal proceeding is 'vested 
with virtually boundless discretion.''') (quoting Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 
480,425 A.2d 632,642 (1981». The judge's discretion is limited only in 
those cases where a specific or minimum sentence is mandated by the crim-
inal code. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 2-201 (2002) (regarding 
murder in the first degree); see also id. § 4-204 (regarding the use of a hand-
gun in the commission of a crime); id. § 14-101 (regarding mandatory 
sentences for crimes of violence). For example, a person convicted of mur-
der in the first degree must be sentenced either to death, imprisonment for 
life without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment for life. [d. § 2-
201(b). Section 14-101 of the Maryland Code lists twenty-one "crimes of 
violence" which carry a mandatory minimum sentence for a second or sub-
sequent violation. [d. § 14-101 (a). Section 4-204 of the Maryland Code 
mandates a minimum sentence of five years for use of a handgun in the 
commission of a felony. [d. § 4-204. 
253. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. hoc. § 6-208 (2001); see also id. § 8-102. The 
Maryland Sentencing Commission "shall adopt sentencing guidelines that 
the Commission may change." [d. § 6-208(a)(I). Any person sentenced to 
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are permissive,254 and in fact, recent statistics reveal that Maryland 
judges sentence outside the guidelines in approximately half of all 
criminal convictions.255 Whatever disparity that may occur as a result 
of sentence modification exists in large part because of the sentencing 
discretion afforded judges by law.256 Sentencing revision may create 
more disparity or conceivably less disparity-if the judge's original 
sentence was on the harsh side-but the disparity is not created by the 
right to revise sentences. The most that can be said in this regard is 
that revision offers judges a chance to create disparity a second time. 
The systemic arguments advanced by those opposed to sentence re-
vision often embody the principles of the retributionist approach to 
punishment discussed in Part N. Retribution is one of the justifica-
tions for punishment that has been approved in Maryland and else-
where. A retributionist is concerned almost exclusively with the 
sentencing result that the punishment fits the crime, a decision that 
can be made at the time of the original sentence.257 
In Maryland, and virtually every other state, however, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation and deterrence are also valid considerations that in-
form ajudge's sentence.258 These three utilitarian punishmentjustifi-
cations may arguably be implemented better at a time beyond the 
original imposition of sentence.259 How rapidly has the offender's al-
cohol, drug or psychological counseling progressed in making him 
less subject to the influences that were at the root of his criminal con-
duct? Has he or she made restitution, completed community service 
or fulfilled other obligations imposed by the judge for the betterment 
more than two years imprisonment' may have the sentence reviewed by a 
threejudge panel. [d. § 8-102(a). 
254, [d. § 6-211 (b). Regulations adopted by the Sentencing Commission "are 
voluntary guidelines that a court need not follow." [d, 
255. MD. STATE COMM'N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, supra note 202. In 
1999, only 41.8% of sentences fell within the guidelines. [d. The number 
increased to 48.8% in 2000 and 50.9% in 2001. [d. 
256. See State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 80, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285-86 (2001). Prosecu-
tors have exactly the same very limited right to appeal a sentence whether it 
is an original sentence or a modified one. [d. In both cases, the state may 
appeal only if the judge has failed to impose a statutorily mandatory sen-
tence. [d. 
257, VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 31, 64. Retribution, or just deserts, seeks to 
punish an offender for the act committed commensurate with the harm 
inflicted and the moral wrongfulness of the act. [d. at 31. Andrew von 
Hirsch defines harm as "the injury done or risked by the criminal act." [d. 
at 64. In assessing wrongfulness or culpability, he looks to "the factors of 
intent, motive and circumstance." [d. 
258. Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 265, 647 A.2d 1204, 1209 (1994); State v. 
Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992); Johnson v. 
State, 274 Md. 536, 540, 336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975). 
259. Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality, supra note 5. Chief Judge 
Robert Bell of the Court of Appeals of Maryland opined that "[sentence 
revision] is flexibility aimed at the rehabilitation of the person in front of 
you ... , If your aim is retribution, this thing doesn't make sense," [d. 
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of the victim or the offender? Does the offender still pose such a dan-
ger to the community that he needs to be separated from it? Has the 
offender been punished enough so that he will regard the conse-
quences of being apprehended and punished for criminal conduct as 
outweighing the benefits of such conduct? Many judges and other 
proponents of sentence revision believe that all of these questions are 
best answered after observing the defendant for some time after his 
sentence has begun and that the judge is best positioned to evaluate 
them.260 
Inextricably linked to the positions expressed immediately above is 
the belief that people looking forward to at least some possibility of 
reward are more likely to change their behavior in order to achieve 
that reward.261 A prisoner who has an application for sentence reduc-
tion pending before ajudge has much more incentive to behave prop-
erly and work toward improvement than one who has no possibility of 
release for many years.262 
Such incentives are regarded as having benefits within penal institu-
tions as well. Offenders are said to be less likely to cause trouble 
within custodial institutions if they know that by not engaging in such 
conduct, they increase their chances for having their sentences re-
duced.263 Motivational benefits deriving from an offender's aware-
ness of the possibility of sentence modification occur in non-custodial 
260. [d. "Maryland Judges want to retain flexibility with a goal toward rehabili-
tating defendants." [d. (inteIViewing Robert Bell, Chief Judge of the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland). 
I think that it is often used in a rehabilitative approach that meets 
with everybody's approval, including the prosecutor's .... Many, 
for the first time in their lives, are meeting their goals. Is that all 
teary-eyed liberal rehabilitation stuff? Or is it better to throw the 
guy in for 18 months? I think it's a very legitimate use of the mo-
tion for reconsideration. 
Roig-Franzia & Mosk, supra note 209 (interviewing Howard County Circuit 
Court Judge Dennis Sweeny). 
261. Anne Arundel County Circuit Judge Joseph Manck testified before the 
House Judiciary Committee that sentence modification was "a tremendous 
tool we judges have. It's a very, very powerful incentive." Daniel LeDuc, 
Maryland Judges oppose Resentencing Curb; Testimony is on Bill to Set J-Year 
Limit, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at CA13. 
262. "I believe very strongly that somebody who has a motion for modification 
pending is going to be a better prisoner." Montgomery & LeDuc, Sentences 
Without Finality, supra note 5 (quoting Joseph Murphy, Chief Judge of the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland). This view is also held by many who 
work in the corrections system. Patricia Cushwa, the Chair of the Maryland 
Parole Commission, believes that the carrot-stick approach that is furthered 
by the possibility of sentence revision has a positive effect within Maryland's 
penal institution. Interview with Patricia Cushwa, Chair of the Maryland 
Parole Commission (Sept. 17,2003). 
263. The hope for a reduction in sentence is foremost in a pris-
oner's mind and has a substantial effect on a prisoner's perform-
ance in prison .... The court should have the right to look at an 
inmate's conduct in prison. When a motion for reconsideration is 
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sentences as well. Judges in Maryland often use sentence revision as a 
way of granting convicted defendants PBJ. PBJ is a means by which a 
judge can reward a defendant by having the conviction wiped off his 
record if he achieves the specific goals set by the judge. Many judges 
report changing a defendant's sentence to PBJ after completion of a 
prison sentence or after successful completion of the conditions of his 
probation.264 Many judges believe that offenders are likely to work 
harder to achieve these goals if they know they can come back before 
the same judge to demonstrate that their salutary behavior is now de-
serving of probation before judgment. 
Those who argue against the need for sentence revision note that 
the judge can sentence the defendant to PBJ at the time when the 
original sentence is imposed.265 Should the defendant not abide by 
the conditions set by the judge, the probation can be revoked and the 
judge can impose any sentence that could have been imposed origi-
nally. Although this might be a satisfactory alternative in some cases, 
judges cite several limitations. First, pursuant to the statute, it cannot 
be used in all cases; for example, a second conviction for drug posses-
sion or any sentence over three years for District Court and five years 
for Circuit Court.266 Second, this procedure does not give the judge 
as much control as sentence reduction. With PBJ, judges are depen-
dent upon the probation authorities to notify them if the defendant 
has violated the terms of the probation. With sentence reduction, the 
burden is upon the defendant to come before the judge and demon-
strate that the conditions have been met.267 
A final motivational advantage of the possibility of sentence revision 
involves the use of the defendant to assist in the capture of other 
criminals or in their prosecution. Sentenced defendants can be 
brought back before the judge and have their sentences reduced pur-
suant to an agreement with the prosecutor either that they disclose 
information the police need in a criminal investigation or that they 
agree to testify for the prosecution in cases related or unrelated to 
their own conviction.268 
pending, the one person the inmate wants to impress the most is 
the sentencing judge. 
STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7 (describing statement of Committee 
member Joseph Vallario). 
264. See supra Part VI.C.2. 
265. STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7. Robert Dean, an Anne Arundel 
County State's Attorney and Committee member said "[t]he legislature has 
dealt with this issue by providing for probation before judgment and a five-
year period of probation." Id. 
266. Crimes which are exempted from PBJ are listed at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC. § 6-220(d) (2001). See also id. § 6-227. 
267. STANDING COMM., supra note 206, at 7 (detailing statements of Judge 
Anthony Vaughn and Chief Judge Joseph Murphy). 
268. At least five judges reported in the survey that they had reduced sentences 
pursuant to the revisory power due to the defendant's cooperation with the 
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VI. SURVEY OF JUDGES' USE OF POWER TO REVISE 
SENTENCES269 
A. Process and Goals 
During the 2002 session of the Maryland General Assembly, a bill 
was introduced to limit the power of judges to revise the sentences of 
convicted offenders downward pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345.270 
In response to the proposal, representatives of the MSBA testified 
before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Delegates. The crux 
of this testimony was that before action was taken to alter or revoke 
the revisory power of judges more information was needed, beyond 
merely the anecdotal, regarding the frequency and the manner in 
which judges use the revisory power.271 
While the above referenced bill never made it through the House 
of Delegates, the MSBA believed that any future consideration of the 
revisory power would benefit greatly from information gathered from 
court files and the views of judges concerning judicial use of this 
power. Accordingly, the MSBA formed a Task Force consisting of 
Buzz Winchester of the MSBA and Professors Jose Anderson, Stephen 
Shapiro and Steven Grossman (Chair), all of the University of Balti-
more School of Law. As part of this process, a survey designed to gain 
some insight into their practices and beliefs about the revisory power 
was sent to all Maryland Circuit Court and District Court judges. 
The survey instrument272 was developed after consultation with the 
Maryland Sentencing Commission, representatives of the Conference 
of Circuit Court Judges, Maryland District Court Judges and Chief 
Judge Joseph Murphy of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
Of the approximately 250 surveys sent out, seventy-six were re-
turned. The Survey was designed not to get hard numbers (in large 
part because the judges have no real access to these numbers), but to 
ascertain the approaches that judges take and their reasons for doing 
so. Therefore, while the study does not yield results of a highly empir-
ical nature, the seventy-six surveys that were returned reveal some 
police or prosecution. See supra Part VI. One judge reported a case in 
which a defendant had been sentenced to thirty years, all but fifteen sus-
pended after his conviction for caIjacking and robbery with a deadly 
weapon. Id. In exchange for the defendant's cooperation and testimony in 
a murder prosecution, the judge revised the sentence to thirty years, all but 
two suspended. Id. 
269. The survey data is available for review in the office of Professor Steven 
Grossman at the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
270. S. 73, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002); H.D. 160, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2002). 
271. MD. STATE BAR Assoc., 2003 PRELIMINARY STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM: JUDI-
CIAL Po\VER TO REVISE CRIMINAL SENTENCES (2003), available at http://www. 
msba.org/sec_comm/lawcomm/legislativeprogram/legislprogram.htm. 
272. Infra Appendix. 
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clear trends regarding how judges approach and exercise the revisory 
power and do allow for the drawing of some significant conclusions. 
The SUIVey was divided into two parts. The first part asked ques-
tions about the general approaches that the judges take when they 
receive a motion for sentence modification.273 The second part asked 
the judges to recall specific instances in which sentence modification 
was granted and asked questions about those cases.274 
B. Results of First Part of Survey 
1. How often granted? 
Approximately seventy percent of judges reported that they granted 
motions for modification either never or rarely-thirty-nine out of 
fifty-six of those who responded appropriately to this question. The 
others said that they granted sentence modification motions 
frequently. 
2. How long after the motion is filed? 
The judges were asked how often they granted motions for sentence 
modification more than one year after the motion was made and how 
often after more than five years. The clear response of the judges was 
that the majority of motions for sentence modification that are 
granted occur within the first year of the defendant's sentencing. 
When looking at the second time period, the overwhelming result of 
the SUIVey was that judges rarely granted modification motions after 
five years. 
Of the cases in which they granted sentence modification, most 
judges reported that only five percent or fewer of those modifications 
granted occur outside the one-year period-thirty-nine out of sixty-
five judges reporting used a figure of five percent or less. Of the cases 
in which they granted sentence modification, over 4/5 of the judges 
reported that only one percent of those modifications granted oc-
curred outside the five-year period-fifty-three of sixty-three reporting 
used a figure of one percent or less. 
3. How often do defendants file motions for modification? 
The response of the judges revealed no pattern as to what percent-
age of defendants file motions for modification. The numbers varied 
widely, from very few-one, five, and ten percent-to very many-
ninety, ninety-five, and one-hundred percent. This may reflect the 
fact that judges have varying reputations for how seriously they con-
sider modification motions, and accordingly defense attorneys rou-
tinely file motions with some judges and do not with others. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
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4. How often were hearings held? 
Judges were asked how often they granted hearings when modifica-
tion motions were made to them. Most judges said they granted hear-
ings less than half of the time such motions were made-fifty-one of 
seventy-one judges reporting used the figure of fifty percent or less. 
As to the judges who reported granting hearings more than half the 
time, the percentage of hearings granted varied widely-up to ninety 
and one-hundred percent of the time for a few of the judges. 
5. When hearings were held, how often was there no objection to 
sentence modification from the prosecutor? 
Judges were asked whether in cases in which hearings were held, 
how often the prosecutor objected to the defendant's receiving some 
sort of sentence modification. Most judges reported that in the major-
ity of cases, prosecutors made no objection to the granting of some 
sentence modification-forty-five of sixty-five judges responding said 
that prosecutors objected less than half of the time. Almost half of the 
judges reported that prosecutors did not object to modification in sev-
enty-five percent or more of such cases-thirty-one of sixty-five judges 
responding. 
6. How often were motions for modification denied? 
This question, similar to the Survey's first question, attempted to get 
the judges to report in estimated numbers their sense of how often 
they deny modification motions. A clear majority of the judges re-
ported that they deny such motions seventy-five percent or more of 
the time-forty of sixty-five judges responding. The numbers varied 
widely for the other judges. 
7. What goals are to be achieved from holding the motion sub curia? 
The judges were asked what goals they hoped would be achieved 
while they held the motion sub curia. By far, the goal that appeared 
most often on the Survey was that the defendant would make signifi-
cant progress or complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program-
fifty of the seventy-six survey forms mentioned this. Other goals men-
tioned by a significant number of judges were: waiting to see if the 
defendant paid monetary restitution (twenty-four); having the defen-
dant successfully complete the period and terms of his probation 
(eighteen); seeing whether the defendant would stay out of trouble in 
one manner or another (twelve); seeing whether the defendant would 
complete or make significant progress in an educational program 
(twelve); determining whether ~e defendant had been rehabilitated 
(eleven); and seeing whether the defendant exhibited exemplary con-
duct while incarcerated (ten). Other goals mentioned less frequently 
were: completing community service (four); recognizing that the de-
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fendant had been punished enough (four); to comply with the terms 
of a plea bargain that modification be granted or considered (two); to 
reflect the defendant's aging (one); giving the defendant a break as a 
first offender (one); and seeing that the defendant complied with a 
no contact order (one). 
Clearly, the vast majority of the goals mentioned by the judges had 
to do with determining if the defendant rehabilitated him or herself 
in one manner or the other or that the defendant complied with 
terms of the original sentence, such as making restitution, performing 
community service or completing probation. 
8. What criteria were used in deciding whether modification should 
be granted? 
The judges were asked what criteria they used in deciding whether 
to grant sentencing modification motions. Not surprisingly, the re-
sponses to this question were somewhat similar to the ones immedi-
atelyabove. 
This time, however, the question contained within it examples of 
some of the criteria generally accepted as reasons for granting such a 
motion: successful completion of an alcohol! drug/psychiatric treat-
ment; exemplary conduct while serving a term of confinement; coop-
eration with law enforcement officers and/or prosecutors; payment of 
restitution; illness or injury; family and/or community support. On 
slightly less than half of the surveys returned-thirty-three out of sev-
enty-six-judges simply wrote "all of the above" criteria were used. Of 
the judges who chose to mention criteria individually, the one men-
tioned most was participation in alcohol or drug rehabilitation pro-
grams (thirty-four), followed by: paying restitution (seventeen); 
completing probation (ten); exemplary conduct while incarcerated 
(six); staying out of trouble (six); cooperation with police or prosecu-
tors (six); performing community service (five); becoming rehabili-
tated (four); participation in educational programs (four); illness or 
age (four); that the crime was a first offense (three); attempting to 
ameliorate the impact of changing parole guidelines (two); and the 
defendant's role as a victim (one). 
C. Results of Second Part of the Survey 
The judges were asked to detail three cases in which sentencing 
modification was granted. 
1. What offense was the defendant convicted of when modification 
granted? 
In providing examples of cases in which sentencing modification 
was granted, judges were asked first to state the offense involved. The 
most significant finding that emerged from this question was that four 
2003] Judicial Modification of Sentences in Maryland 41 
classes of crimes were clearly mentioned most often by judges in the 
examples they gave. Those four were: theft offenses (twenty-one); 
driving while intoxicated or impaired (nineteen); simple possession of 
drugs (seventeen); and sale or possession with intent to distribute 
drugs (fifteen). Other classes of crimes mentioned were: some type of 
assault (six); robbery or attempted robbery (five); burglary or house-
breaking (five); child abuse or contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor (three); manslaughter voluntary and involuntary (two); viola-
tion of probation (two); driving with a suspended license (one); mur-
der (one); arson (one); and rape (one). 
2. Other information provided involving specific examples cited. 
The remainder of the information supplied by the judges does not 
lend itself to quantifiable findings, and even if it did, as the cases are 
self-selected, examples would not yield figures of any real empirical 
value. Still, the kinds of cases offered by the judges and their reasons 
for modifYing sentences offer important insights into their practices. 
The examples offered suggest that judges frequently use the revi-
sory power to remove a criminal conviction in cases involving defend-
ants who have succeeded in rehabilitating themselves in some 
meaningful way and whose further recovery may be negatively im-
pacted by a criminal conviction on their record. Many of the exam-
ples mentioned involved typical drug possession or driving under the 
influence cases in which defendants that successfully completed drug 
or alcohol rehabilitation programs had their sentences of probation 
or short jail terms modified to PBJ. 
There were, however, other cases involving more serious crimes, 
such as the man convicted of second degree assault for beating his 
wife who successfully completed a domestic violence program, went 
through intensive counseling with his wife and whose future employ-
ment prospects were seriously hampered by his conviction. Also, 
there was the woman suffering from a mental illness who had consen-
sual sex with a minor that led to a conviction for contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor. She was awarded a PBJ after fully complying 
with the terms of her probation, obtaining psychiatric help and after a 
letter from her psychiatrist requesting the modification. One judge 
spoke of a serious case of arson in which a young man suffering from 
mental illness burned down the house of his grandparents. The judge 
required and received monthly letters from the defendant co-signed 
by the grandparents detailing the progress in his treatment, his activi-
ties and his plans. Mter some time, the judge modified his sentence 
of probation and gave the young man a PBJ. The judge reported that 
the young man recently graduated from the University of Maryland 
with a degree in engineering. Another judge told of a serious drug 
case in which the defendant had his sentence changed to a PBJ two 
42 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
years after the original sentence and upon the defendant's success-
fully completing Job Corps and his acceptance into the U.S. Army. 
Some judges have used the revisory power to shorten the jail 
sentences of defendants, occasionally in cases involving serious 
crimes. Often this is done because the judge finds that the defendant 
had an exemplary record within the correctional institution and that 
concrete steps have been taken by the defendant to deal with the root 
causes of what led him to commit the crime. Typical of such cases is a 
young man whose original sentence of ten years in prison was modi-
fied to three years because he had an excellent institutional record, 
took advantage of programs available to him, had the full support of 
his family and the fact that the crime for which he was incarcerated 
was his first offense. 
In other cases, judges sought to change the sentence of defendants 
once they had served time in prison and were succeeding after their 
release. A defendant who had served prison time for manslaughter 
and had been released had his sentence modified nine years after his 
original sentence because of the nature of his crime (as a seventeen 
year old he shot a friend), his educational advancements while in 
prison, his remorse, and the fact that at the time of the modification, 
the defendant was gainfully employed and had the support of his fam-
ily. At times, judges have used the revisory power to allow defendants 
to leave jailor prison early in order to enter intensive drug rehabilita-
tion programs at the time when beds become available. 
In still other cases, judges reported using their revisory power to 
address what they believed was a clear injustice. In one case, a man 
who was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for violating his parole 
on an original conviction of criminal contempt for failing to make 
child support payments had his sentence modified when a belated 
DNA test revealed he was not the father. One judge reported modify-
ing a sentence nine years after the motion was filed because of the 
facts surrounding the defendant's original conviction and sentence. 
In this case, a retired judge had offered the defendant a concurrent 
sentence if he pled guilty to robbery with a dangerous weapon. The 
defendant refused the offer and upon being convicted after trial, re-
ceived consecutive sentences that were ten to twenty years higher than 
those he would have received under the guidelines that were adopted 
after his sentence. The reporting judge modified the sentence to con-
form to the guidelines then in existence and noted that this also 
avoided the need to deal with the defendant's claim that his sentence 
was retaliation for rejecting the original plea. Another judge reported 
a defendant's receiving a mandatory twenty-five year no parole sen-
tence for being a repeat violent offender. The violent offense for 
which he was convicted was daytime housebreaking in which the de-
fendant stole a watch and some jewelry. His prior violent crimes were 
also daytime housebreaking convictions. Shortly after the defendant 
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was sentenced, the General Assembly removed daytime housebreak-
ing from the list of violent crimes. The judge modified the defen-
dant's sentence down to ten years. 
D. Suroey Conclusions 
The results of the Survey indicate that a clear m;:yority of the mo-
tions for sentence modification that are granted occur within one year 
of the time that the motion is filed. An overwhelming majority of 
those granted occur within the first five years after the motion is filed. 
It is also clear from the Survey that in a majority of cases in which 
modification is granted, such modification occurs without the objec-
tion of the prosecution. Although some crimes for which sentencing 
modification is granted are serious or violent felonies, the survey re-
sults suggest strongly that sentence modification is used, by far, most 
often for cases concerning theft, drugs, and driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs. 
It is clear that judges use their power of revision to achieve various 
goals, most frequently ones related to the offender's ability to rehabili-
tate him or herself in one way or another or to address the damage 
resulting from the crime, such as by paying restitution. The direct 
result of judicial modification of sentences is that defendants receive a 
sentence that reduces or mitigates the sentence that was originally 
meted out to them. One indirect, but inevitable, result of this is that 
there will be an increase in the disparity of sentences given to defend-
ants who com~it the same crime. In a system that prizes consistency 
above all and is based on retribution as the primary, if not exclusive, 
theory of punishment (such as the federal sentencing system of 
mandatory guidelines), the use of a judicial revisory power would be 
anathema. In a system such as that which exists in Maryland, where 
theories of rehabilitation, retribution and deterrence are all accepted 
theories of punishment and where judges are afforded significantly 
more sentencing discretion than in the federal system, many judges 
believe that some disparity is a worthwhile price to pay in order to be 
able to tailor a sentence to the needs of the defendant and the com-
munity in specific cases. The vast majority of judges who responded to 
this Survey believe that the revisory power allows them the time and 
flexibility they need to better inform their determination of how best 
to accomplish these sentencing goals. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This Article has reviewed the power of sentencing judges in Mary-
land to modify a defendant's sentence. Maryland gives its judges 
some of the broadest powers and longest modification power of any 
state. They may reduce a sentence at any time during its duration, for 
any reason they deem proper, so long as the defendant has made a 
44 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
motion within ninety days of sentencing and the revised sentence stays 
above any statutory minimum. 
Not surprisingly, such broad power has its critics, and attempts have 
been made during the last several legislative sessions to put a one-year 
time limit on it. There is every reason to believe that this controversy 
will not go away, and that new attempts will be made to restrict the 
power of Maryland judges to modify sentences. 
The authors of this Article believe that this judicial power should 
not be eliminated or significantly curtailed. In Maryland, judges are 
given great discretion at the time of sentencing to determine the 
proper punishment for the defendant, and they remain in the best 
position to determine later, whether this punishment should be 
changed. The authors believe that this judicial power compliments, 
rather than usurps, the executive parole function. It can be quite 
helpful, particularly in fulfilling the rehabilitative purposes of our pe-
nal system. If there have been a small number of abuses or bad deci-
sions in the past, the new rules calling for victim notification and for 
judges to give their reasons for sentence reduction in open court 
should go a long way toward solving any existing problems. 
The study done by the authors of this Article has shown that many 
judges use the possibility of sentence reduction as an effective incen-
tive to shape a defendant's behavior, most often to complete drug or 
alcohol treatment. Establishing a one-year time limit would greatly 
interfere with this ability, because one year is often too short a period 
to determine if the defendant has completed the ne.cessary steps to 
change his behavior. 
Although, in the final analysis, the authors do not believe that any 
time limitation is necessary, if one is to be imposed, then a five-year 
period would be a more reasonable compromise. Under no circum-
stances, however, should a limit shorter than three years be imposed. 
Anything less than three years will severely interfere with the power of 
sentence reduction as a useful tool for changing defendants' 
behavior. 
There has also been some consideration of eliminating or limiting 
the power in cases of violent crime. This is a more difficult, compli-
cated question. On the one hand, judges appear to use this power 
very sparingly and only after careful consideration. On the other 
hand, the victims of violent crime and the public in general believe 
that dangerous, violent criminals should be kept off the streets for all, 
or at least the majority, of their original sentences. 
It should be remembered that judges are already somewhat limited 
in their power to reduce the sentences of many violent offenders due 
to mandatory sentences for certain crimes. While this is a closer ques-
tion, the authors believe that no other restrictions are necessary. 
Judges can continue to make these difficult decisions on a case-by-case 
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basis, just as they do at sentencing, under the scrutiny of prosecutors, 
victims, and the public. 
If, however, judges' ability to modify the sentences of those con-
victed of crimes of violence is restricted, it should not be completely 
eliminated. There should still be some period of time, no shorter 
than 180 days, for the judge to reconsider- any sentence, including for 
a serious, violent crime. The majority of states give judges this power, 
so they can reconsider whether a sentence is too harsh, or was handed 
down without adequate consideration of all relevant factors. 
One thing that was determined during the research for this Article 
is that it was very difficult to get an accurate picture of when and how 
sentence reduction was being used, due to inadequate record keeping 
at the county level. There should be a requirement that judges trans-
mit, and counties maintain, a record of each use of this power. This 
would make it much easier in the future to evaluate its use and/or 
abuse. 
We also believe that the current requirement that a defendant file a 
motion for modification within ninety days is neither necessary nor 
helpful. Under current law, it would seem to be malpractice for a 
lawyer not to make this motion in every case, even though in most 
cases the judge is not asked to act on it immediately. Even though it 
may appear highly unlikely at the time of sentencing that the judge 
will ever modify the defendant's sentence, it is impossible to predict 
what might happen years into the future. Because there is no risk and 
little cost in time to file such a pro forma motion, and the conse-
quences could be so devastating if it is neglected, it should always be 
filed. 
But a motion that is, or should be, made in every case, merely to 
preserve a defendant's right to ask for modification years into the fu-
ture (usually based on circumstances that haven't yet occurred) serves 
no valid purpose. It would make much more sense to require the 
motion at the time the defendant is actively seeking modification, 
based on facts or factors that are present at the time of the motion. If 
there is a time limit imposed on the judges' power, then the limit for 
making the motion should be ninety or 180 days before that limit. 
46 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
APPENDIX 
Please circle the most accurate term: 
I (~) (~) (cl1ru) grant a motion for modification. 
In approximately what percentage of the cases for which you have 
granted modification has it been over one (1) year: __ %; over five 
(5) years: __ %; after the motion was filed. 
Please Hn in the appropriate information: 
Approximately __ % of the defendants I sentenced have filed a 
motion for modification. 
I have held hearings in approximately __ % of the cases in which I 
was asked to modify a defendant's sentence. 
In approximately __ % of the cases in which I held a hearing on a 
motion for modification, the State did not object to the defendant 
receiving some sort of modification. 
General questions: 
In approximately what percentage of cases have you denied a mo-
tion for modification? __ % 
In cases in which you held a motion for modification sub curia, what 
are the goals that you hoped the defendant would achieve? 
What criteria have you used in deciding motions for modification 
(e.g., successful completion of alcohol! drug/ psychiatric treatment; 
exemplary conduct while serving a term of confinement; cooperation 
with law enforcement officers and/or prosecutors; payment of restitu-
tion; illness or injury; family and/or community support)? 
To the extent you are reasonably able, please provide the following 
information about cases in which you granted a motion for modiHca-
tion of sentence: 
Case No. I (we appreciate that providing this information takes 
time, but please provide us with as many cases as time permits) 
The offense that the defendant committed: 
The sentence initially imposed: 
The period of time between the initial sentence and the modified 
sentence: 
The modified sentence: 
The reason(s) why the motion was granted: 
Case No.2 
The offense that the defendant committed: 
The sentence initially imposed: 
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The period of time between the initial sentence and the modified 
sentence: 
The modified sentence: 
The reason(s) why the motion was granted: 
Case No.3 
The offense that the defendant committed: 
The sentence initially imposed: 
The period of time between the initial sentence and the modified 
sentence: 
The modified sentence: 
The reason(s) why the motion was granted: 
